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Although strains of modern political thought have lost sight of the dignity and 
especially the fallibility of human beings (focusing instead on social and economic 
structures), the writings of Alexis de Tocqueville and Michael Oakeshott display a 
strong focus on human character. This thesis argues that the insights gained from an 
understanding of the human character lead both thinkers to adopt a sceptical 
conservative disposition towards politics and the state. Oakeshott and Tocqueville 
are pessimistic because of the pride and sensuality (the two poles between which the 
human character swings) which colour politics, but also seek to protect and give 
expression to the moral agency or free will that gives humankind its unique dignity. 
This leads them to hold conservative attitudes both towards the state, being critical 
of state actions that impose on the individuals a substantive common goal or 
enterprise, and towards politics, being suspicious of attempts to rid politics of its 
uncertainties by seeking to base political decisions on proof rather than on 
persuasion. They warn us that when politics does not know its limits – when it aims 
to be what it is not – what results are oppression and the destruction of the 
reasonable hopes of countless individuals. Appreciating this sceptical conservative 
disposition therefore adds some much-needed balance into the discourse and habits 









 ON COMPARING TOCQUEVILLE AND 
OAKESHOTT 
 
Modern politics and Western liberal democracy in particular seems to be in 
crisis and the discontent with democracy has been a fruitful topic in academic 
literature. Michael Sandel in Democracy’s Discontent wonders whether, at a time 
when democratic ideals are spreading across the world, Americans ‘have lost 
possession of them at home.’1 He identifies two core fears that reach to the core of 
democracy’s discontent: fears of the loss of self-government and the loss of moral 
fabric of community. These lie at the basis of other topics of national debate, like the 
scope of the welfare state and the extent of rights.
2
 Stephen C. Craig, in a volume 
titled Broken Contract, details the crisis of legitimacy that the American political 
institutions – the President, Congress and the two-party system – were facing in 
1996.
3
 This crisis has deepened over the intervening decade. Among respondents to 
a 2011 Gallup Poll, 36% said that they had very little or no trust in the presidency 
and 48% indicated very little or no trust in Congress (with a dismal 12% saying they 
had a great deal or quite a lot of trust in the latter).
4
  
Mark Ellingsen proposes a somewhat paradoxical analysis of the state of 
democratic politics: there has been too much unrestrained optimism – occasionally 
bordering on utopianism – surrounding political action. Ellingsen argues that an 
                                                          
1
 Michael J. Sandel, Democracy’s Discontents: America in Search of a Public Philosophy 
(Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 1996), 3 
2
 Ibid.  
3
 Stephen C. Craig, ‘Change and the American Electorate’,  in Broken Contract ed. Stephen 
C. Craig (Boulder: WestviewPress, 1996), 6-9. 
4
 Jeffrey M. Jones, ‘Americans Most Confident in Military, Least in Congress.’ Gallup 
Politics (June 23, 2011). http://www.gallup.com/poll/148163/americans-confident-military-
least-congress.aspx. Last accessed: June 12, 2012. 
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Augustinian realism informed the framing of the US Constitution and that present 
practice and discourse neglects this realism.
5
 A Gallup poll conducted in 2008 
showed that while trust in holders of or aspirants to political office had dropped to an 
all-time low of 49%, there has been, since the 1970s, a consistently high level of 
trust in ‘the American people as a whole when it comes to making judgments under 
our democratic system about the issues facing our country’.6  Although optimism 
seems harmless in politics it leads to serious and complex problems. The two major 
results of optimism in politics and the state are the growth of state power and the 
danger of totalitarianism on the one hand and the disappointment on the part of 
citizens when hopes aren’t realized on the other. American politics, Ellingsen says, 
has capitulated to the belief in the fundamental goodness of human nature and the 
priority of the immediate gratification of individual wants over the common good. 
However, when the actual dynamics of politics fail to live up to these beliefs and 
when citizens do not get all that they now expect from government, they become 
cynical: a ‘negative, nihilistic cynicism’. 7 
One need not accept Ellingsen’s assertions to agree that political discourse 
is in need of the countervailing weight of scepticism – something very different from 
this cynicism – regarding both human nature and political speech and action. This 
strain of political understanding once enjoyed a relatively strong presence but has 
retreated, especially in the face of some strands of Enlightenment rationalism 
(despite the setbacks that this rationalism has since faced). In this thesis, I argue that 
Alexis de Tocqueville and Michael Oakeshott, two modern thinkers who seem 
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dissimilar superficially, share a common sceptical conservative disposition and that 
such an understanding of their work contributes to a more balanced political 
discourse.  
Oakeshott has been compared with several prominent philosophers, 
including Plato and Aristotle, St. Augustine, Michel de Montaigne, Hegel, and 
unsurprisingly, given his careful attention to the seventeenth-century thinker, 
Thomas Hobbes.
8
 He has, however, not been studied in conjunction with another 
influential political thinker: Alexis de Tocqueville. Tocqueville and Oakeshott have 
indeed been placed side by side at least once: Steven M. DeLue’s chapter on 
Burke’s, Tocqueville’s and Oakeshott’s ‘Conservative View’ of civil society is an 
example.
9
 DeLue’s chapter looks at the most prominent facets of Tocqueville’s and 
Oakeshott’s writings – the former’s promotion of associations of civil life and the 
latter’s understanding of the state as a human association. But DeLue’s discussion 
does not go deep because his aim in comparing Tocqueville and Oakeshott (and 
Burke) is only to demonstrate the diversity of thought present among the 
conservative views of civil society.
10
 Nor, though he mentions Tocqueville several 
times in different writings, and each time treats him with great respect, does 
Oakeshott himself give Tocqueville sustained attention.  
Underlying each philosopher’s worldview, however, is a shared 
understanding of the human character. Both hold that human beings possess the 
unique dignity of being free moral agents and this must be protected and given 
expression in our politics; yet the human character also bears several ‘faults’ which 
                                                          
8
 See, for example, John Wendell Coats, Oakeshott and his Contemporaries: Montaigne, St. 
Augustine, Hegel, et al. (Selinsgrove: Susquehanna University Press, 2000) and Debra 
Candreva, The Enemies of Perfection: Oakeshott, Plato, and the Critique of Rationalism 
(Lanham: Lexington Books, 2005). 
9
 Steven M. DeLue, Political Thinking, Political Theory, and Civil Society (Boston: Allyn 
and Bacon, 1997), 234-262. 
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 Ibid. 236. 
 4 
must not be ignored when thinking about politics. In combination ,these two beliefs 
lead them to adopt what this thesis calls a sceptical conservative disposition: an 
attitude which accommodates both the dignity and the fallibility of humankind.
11
  
Oakeshott and Tocqueville reject the modern tendency in politics to focus 
on social and economic structures of a society at the expense of an awareness of the 
intricacies of the individual and on human character. Modern politics exhibits a 
considerable faith in human affairs and in the ability of politics and the state to solve 
the problems that beset human society. A sensitivity to human pride and sensuality 
lead Oakeshott and Tocqueville to reject this modern optimism and cause them to be 
oppose attempts both to concentrate power in the state and to impose on individuals 
a common substantive goal or enterprise. It also leads them to criticize efforts to rid 
politics of its uncertainty by seeking a politics of proof rather than of persuasion. 
The former endeavours, though perhaps born out of noble intentions (but often not), 
are prideful and are bound, at best, to lead to failure. At worst they lead to 
oppression and the destruction of the mundane and realistic hopes of countless 
individuals who find themselves involved (willingly or unwillingly) in such projects. 
By placing Oakeshott and Tocqueville side by side, this thesis aims to contribute to 
the effort of introducing into the political ‘conversation’ more voices of scepticism, 
thus helping counteract an excessive optimism and faith in politics. 
 
Is Tocqueville Still Relevant? 
Alexis de Tocqueville has been called a moralist, an anthropologist, a legal 
historian, a philosopher, a prophet.
12
 His influence on the academic fields of history, 
                                                          
11
 Timothy Fuller uses the term ‘skeptical conservatism’ to describe Oakeshott’s thought, but 
does not offer an in-depth explanation of the label. Timothy Fuller, ‘Foreword’, Rationalism 
in Politics and Other Essays (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1991), xv. 
 5 
and especially sociology and political science has been immense and he has left a 
lasting impact on our understanding of the concepts of democracy and civil society, 
freedom, equality, individualism, among others. Praise of the Frenchman has been 
glowing, and he is widely considered one of the most significant of the modern 
political thinkers, taking his place with Machiavelli, Hobbes and Marx. He is 
considered, along with the latter, as the most important social thinker of the 
nineteenth century.
13
 Two centuries since his birth, which was celebrated in the 
United States, Italy, Belgium, Germany, Poland, and Canada, interest in 
Tocqueville’s intellectual legacy is still high. Since 2000, five new English 
translations of his most famous work, Democracy in America, have been published 
and new translations of The Old Regime and the Revolution, his second most 
important book, have appeared as well.
14
 One reason for the general enthusiasm and 
praise of Tocqueville could be that he is so often quoted but so infrequently read in 
his entirety.  It could also be because what is most obvious in Tocqueville’s writing 
are descriptions of concrete, practical political institutions that he believes are 
necessary for freedom. These suggestions are prophetic but are not as controversial 
as, say, the Hobbesian or Lockean views on human nature. The ambiguity of his 
metaphysical ideas is perhaps why Tocqueville is not as divisive as these other early-
modern political writers. In the wake of his institutional suggestions, and his famous 
quotes, however, a valuable aspect of Tocqueville’s writing is forgotten. Tocqueville 
does express a more metaphysical understanding on human affairs than he is often 
given credit for and his views on democracy and his institutional design have a 
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 Whitney Pope, Alexis de Tocqueville: His Social and Political Theory (Beverly Hills: 
SAGE Publications, 1986), 11-12 
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 Aurelian Craiutu and Sheldon Gellar, ‘Tocqueville and Us’ in Conversations with 
Tocqueville, eds. Aurelian Craiutu and Sheldon Gellar (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2009), 
1. 
 6 
deeper foundation. Unlike many other political thinkers, however, this foundation is 
often not obvious, and is not the first thing the reader notices when encountering 
Tocqueville’s writing.  
James Abbott points out that while there was a boom in Tocqueville studies 
a few decades ago with preeminent American sociologists applying Tocqueville’s 
thought to contemporary American social and cultural realities, today, Tocqueville is 
rarely encountered in professional sociology.
15
 While Abbott is commenting on the 
field of sociology – and indicates that the same drought of Tocqueville references 
has not occurred in political science – the reason he gives is interesting. He proposes 
that since the 1960s profession sociology had ‘abandoned the very essence of the 
Tocquevillian enterprise: critical analysis of democracy itself.’16 Sociologists have 
turned from a critical analysis of democracy to espousing a faith in democracy 
‘according to which all the ills of democracy can be solved by having more of it.’17 
This approach is deeply at odds with Tocqueville’s approach to democracy. 
Tocqueville is able – due partly to the trauma his family experienced during the 
French Revolution and his own personal experiences as a politician, but surely also 
thanks to his skills as a scholar – to maintain a critical distance from the 
phenomenon of democracy. However, ‘[b]linded by faith in a particular vision of 
democracy, namely egalitarian democracy, sociologists are unable to come to terms 
with the corpus of Tocqueville’s works.’18 For example, it is not a given that the 
increased equality found in America would lead to liberty. Even at the last line of his 
book, he is ambivalent on this: ‘it depends on [the nations themselves] whether 
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 James R. Abbott ‘Whither Tocqueville in American Sociology?’ in The American 








equality leads them to servitude or freedom, to enlightenment or barbarism, to 
prosperity or misery.’19  
Writing in the nineteenth century, Tocqueville observed that ‘the same 
democracy reigning in American societies appeared to me to be advancing rapidly 
toward power in Europe.’20 Though a preeminent writer on democracy, he was not 
certain about the phenomenon he was observing.  He writes of a ‘religious terror’ 
produced in his soul at the sign of the unrelenting march of democracy in Western 
Europe and North America.
21
 Democracy, Tocqueville laments, has ‘been 
abandoned to its savage instincts.’ What was called for was ‘To instruct democracy, 
if possible to reanimate its beliefs, to purify its mores, to regulate its 
movements....’22Democracy in America is aimed less at preaching democracy than 
tempering and managing something that he believed was becoming an undeniable 
fact of western society. 
It is easy to wonder whether Tocqueville’s fears of tyranny and despotism 
are relevant today. The importance of a vibrant civil society has now entered 
conventional wisdom in liberal democratic countries. Freedom and human rights are 
common as slogans and watchwords. However, Frederic Fransen thinks there is 
cause for concern – and argues that Western Europe today ‘poses a striking 
challenge to Tocqueville’s normative positions.’ This could mean either that 
freedom can exist in conditions radically different from those Tocqueville proposes, 
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 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, eds. Harvey C. Mansfield and Delba 
Winthrop (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2000), II 4.8, 676. (DIA) 
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 Ibid. Introduction, 3. 
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or that ‘the long-term future of liberty in Western Europe is grim.’23 Re-examining 
the essence of Tocqueville therefore does have crucial implications today.  
 
Categorizing Tocqueville 
Cheryl Welch talks about Tocqueville’s timelessness: though he was born 
two hundred years ago into a now extinct (and quickly waning even in his own time) 
aristocracy, he seems normatively more relevant today than many of his 
contemporaries.
24
 Tocqueville exerts a paradoxical influence on modern readers who 
are both many and varied in their intellectual allegiances. The paradox, Welch points 
out, is that while his writing is based on detail and context and ‘resists too great an 
abstraction from that context’, such abstraction is often the prerequisite for 
timelessness.
25
 She believes that, to understand Tocqueville, one must read his texts 
in light of his ‘life and times’ and that this requirement is even more imperative for 
Tocqueville than for many other thinkers. She also considers Tocqueville to be ‘less 
of a general theorist of democracy’ than as a scholar of certain key issues that he 
observed in his political world and that have ‘since turned out to present intractable 
tensions in democratic politics and culture.’26 Certainly Tocqueville is famous for his 
diagnosis of what would later turn out to be stark problems of democratic society 
and politics. However, this does not mean that there was no general theory 
underlying and motivating Tocqueville’s diagnosis of these issues. My aim is to 
illuminate this underlying pattern that made Tocqueville write the way he did. 
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 Ibid. 2. 
 9 
A second puzzle lies in the fact that, despite Tocqueville’s pre-eminence as 
a social and political theorist, a recurring theme in Tocqueville studies is the 
apparent difficulty – or even impossibility – of placing the French thinker within any 
of the conventional labels used to categorize political thinkers. Tocqueville has been 
labelled, among others things, an apologist for the aristocracy, a conservative, a 
conservative liberal, a nationalist, a conservative Marxist.
27
 John Lukacs finds 
Tocqueville to be unclassifiable, transcending the liberal and conservative labels.
28
 
Jack Lively argues that the very labels are artificial
29
. Hayden White points out 
Tocqueville made contributions to both liberalism and conservatism
30
, which 
explains why both sides adamantly claim him for themselves. Roger Boesche points 
out that there is enough in Tocqueville to allow would-be allies to selectively find 
evidence that would aid a particular categorization. For instance, Tocqueville had as 
contemporaries and associates several of the great nineteenth century liberals such as 
Pierre-Paul Royer-Collard, Victor Cousin, and John Stuart Mill and shared with 
them a concern about protecting individuals from encroachments by the state.
31
 
Harvey Mansfield and Delba Winthrop note that Tocqueville is quoted approvingly 
by intellectuals and politicians on the ‘Left’ for his thoughts on community and civic 
engagement and for his warnings ‘against the appearance of an industrial aristocracy 
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 Whitney Pope, Alexis de Tocqueville: His Social and Political Theory (1986), 11.  
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 J. Lukacs, ‘Alexis de Tocqueville: a historical appreciation’, Literature of Liberty 5, 
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 Roger Boesche, The Strange Liberalism of Alexis de Tocqueville (Ithaca: Cornell 
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and against the bourgeois or commercial passion for material well-being.’32 As 
examples of his conservative leanings, Boesche mentions that Tocqueville was born 
and remained an aristocrat (though I am unconvinced about the importance of this as 
a conservative credential), his comfort in talking with royalists about his beliefs in 
the dangers of equality, and his respect for tradition and religion.
33
 The ‘Right’ also 
lauds him for his critique of ‘Big Government’ and his support of administrative 
decentralization, as well as for ‘celebrating individual energy and opposing 
egalitarian excess.’34 In short, it is evident, even from this briefest of surveys, that 
the terms being used are neither precise nor definite enough to be useful in a 
scholarly sense.  
The difficulty in pinpointing where Tocqueville’s allegiances lie is 
understandable. Tocqueville himself was disdainful of conventional labels, claiming 
to go further than the parties
35
 and careful ‘not to be confounded with our ordinary 
modern democrats.’36 He describes himself as a liberal; liberty is indeed his clarion 
call and he expresses his ‘desire to see it carried into every political institution in my 
country’.37 However, lest one is inclined to conclude that he was a liberal in the 
conventional sense of the word, Tocqueville qualifies his description: “I shall be 
discovered to be a liberal of a new kind’ and puts forward his ‘respect for justice, ... 
sincere love of order and law [and] deliberate attachment to morality and religion’ as 
features that distinguish himself from the ordinary liberal.
38
 Tocqueville also did not 
provide a clear and complete outline of his fundamental political convictions; he left 
                                                          
32
 Harvey C. Mansfield and Delba Winthrop, DIA, ‘Editors’ Introduction’, xxiv. 
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no definitive political statement and his many, strongly-held political opinions are 
greatly dispersed among his writings.
39
 Finally, Boesche reminds us that if we are to 
study Tocqueville, we cannot afford ‘the intellectual luxury of clinging to the 
twentieth-century categories’ since Tocqueville himself certainly did not have this 
luxury and gropes about for the terminology that best expressed the changing 
political landscape around him.
40
  
The difficulties raised in the previous paragraphs are salient ones. There is, 
however, a consistency in Tocqueville’s works and it is possible to identify the 
essence of his political thought. Since he certainly does not fit neatly into what is 
today conventionally understood as conservative and liberal, and because these 
labels do not mean today what they meant in Tocqueville’s time, merely sticking a 
label on Tocqueville is not of much use. Categorization would thus have to include 
precise definition of the categories proposed.  
It is Tocqueville’s views on the human character that underlie his other, 
more famous, views on democratic institutions and mores and give them coherence. 
They also give Tocqueville the timelessness that Welch observes. Tocqueville sees 
man’s dignity as an individual moral agent, capable of greatness; he also sees 
evidences of man’s failings – his folly and his lust for power – in man’s political 
activity. This awareness leaves Tocqueville sceptical about human affairs: man’s 
capabilities often do not match up to his political ambitions. His inherent belief in 
the dignity and nobility of the individual however, prevents disillusionment and 
bitterness about human affairs. He is cautious, not despairing. A further contribution 
of this study, then, is that the sceptical conservative disposition accommodates the 
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claims of both liberals and conservatives regarding Tocqueville’s allegiance to each 
camp.  
 
What is the Conservative Disposition?  
Like Tocqueville, Oakeshott has also proven to be difficult to neatly parcel 
into any of the conventional categories of political ideology. He is also dismissive of 
political parties, talking about the ‘unpleasing spectacle’ that is politics in general:  
‘The obscurity, the muddle, the excess, the compromise, the indelible 
appearance of dishonesty, the counterfeit piety, the moralism and the 
immorality, the corruption, the intrigue, the negligence, the 
meddlesomeness, the vanity, the self-deception...offend most of our 
rational and all of our artistic sensibilities.’41  
Political parties were a component of an unsavoury development of modern 
European politics – the rise of the ‘anti-individual’ or the ‘mass man’ – and 
contributed to the modern illusion of giving the masses choice without burdening 
them with having to choose anything.
42
  The problem of categorization is not as 
acute concerning Oakeshott as it is with Tocqueville because Oakeshott does 
identify himself with a particular brand of what he calls the conservative disposition 
(as opposed to Conservatism as a political party or ideological category). 
When Oakeshott talks about ‘conservative conduct’ and the ‘conservative 
attitude’ he does not mean Conservatism as a political ideology or political party. 
His theme ‘is not a creed or a doctrine, but a disposition.’43 This is reminiscent of his 
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 Michael Oakeshott, The Politics of Faith and the Politics of Scepticism, ed. Timothy 
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and Other Essays (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1991), 380. (RP) 
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 Michael Oakeshott, ‘On Being Conservative’ in RP, 407. 
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understanding of practical discourse (of which political discourse is a subset) in 
general:  
‘In reflecting upon a response to a practical situation, or in justifying a 
response proposed or made, what we bring with us is a variety of 
beliefs – approvals and disapprovals, preferences and aversions, pro- 
and con- feelings (often vague) moral and prudential maxims of 
varying application and importance, hopes, fears, anxieties, skill in 
estimating the probably consequences of actions, and some general 
beliefs about the world.’44  
These beliefs can be normative, but not as a self-consistent set of principles that can 
unequivocally tell us what we ought to do: ‘they often pull in different directions, 
they compete with one another and cannot all be satisfied at the same time....Even to 
think of them as a “creed” gives them a character they have not got.’45 Oakeshott 
calls such a belief a ‘tradition’ and it is as such a ‘tradition’ that Oakeshott’s 
conservatism takes shape. Tocqueville also exhibits his conservative nature in this 
way. He too holds no doctrine and preaches no creed. His conservative manner must 
be teased out and inferred by examining his preferences and his fears.  
At its root the conservative disposition stems from an attachment to the 
present and the familiar. This is different from the common assumption that 
conservatism involves idolizing the past. There might be gratitude for what the past 
has gifted the present, but the past is not the motivation for Oakeshott’s conservative 
disposition. ‘What is esteemed is the present; and it is esteemed not on account of its 
connections with a remote antiquity, nor because it is recognized to be more 
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admirable than any possible alternative, but on account of its familiarity.’46 The 
conservative also has a particular attitude towards change:  
‘To be conservative...is to prefer the familiar to the unknown, to prefer 
the tried to the untried, fact to mystery, the actual to the possible, the 
limited to the unbounded, the near to the distant, the sufficient to the 
superabundant, the convenient to the perfect, present laughter to 
utopian bliss.’47  
There is regret in the face of change and change always appears as a deprivation.
48
 A 
conservative therefore must accommodate himself to change; he ‘suffers’ change.49 
Contrary to the spirit of the modern times, the conservative ‘is not worried by the 
absence of innovation’ because he is most fully occupied with the present. He 
realises that innovation does not necessarily mean improvement and is mindful of 
the problem of unintended consequences. ‘Innovating is always an equivocal 
enterprise, in which gain and loss...are so closely interwoven that it is exceedingly 
difficult to forecast the final up-shot: there is no such thing as an unqualified 
improvement.’50 It is worth noting that Oakeshott’s conservative disposition draws a 
great deal from the spirit of Michel de Montaigne: ‘I do not change easily, for fear of 
losing in the change.’51 Furthermore, there is the concrete possibility of excessive 
change, unequal distribution of gain and loss and the risk that gains could be off-set 
by changes for the worse.
52
 Regardless of political rhetoric to the contrary, 
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humankind’s march is not always forward to ever greater heights; man’s path is, to 
quote Montaigne, ‘staggering, dizzy, wobbling’.53  
Contrary to popular belief, though, there is no stubborn, blanket rejection of 
all change. The conservative ‘believes that the more closely an innovation resembles 
growth (that is, the more clearly it is intimated in and not merely imposed upon the 
situation) the less likely it is to result in a preponderance of loss.’54 Also, ‘an 
innovation which is a response to some specific defect, one designed to redress some 
specific disequilibrium, is more desirable than one which springs from a notion of a 
generally improved condition of human circumstances, and is far more desirable 
than one generated by a vision of perfection.’55 He also prefers slow changes and 
calculated adjustments to rapid pace. A conservative therefore prefers small, limited 
changes, made in response to contingency rather than grand innovations based on the 
indefinite desire for an ever-improving condition. 
The objection may be made that Oakeshott never actually calls himself a 
conservative in his essay. He speaks with detachment about the ‘conservative 
disposition’ and always refers to the conservative in the third person. Perhaps this is 
an instance of him saying too little out of the fear of saying too much; he might be 
taking pains not to be identified with a political platform. However, it would not be 
too much of a stretch to conclude that Oakeshott does, in fact, identify himself with 
the disposition that he takes such care in detailing. The conservative, Oakeshott says, 
believes that changes in politics must be incremental corrections rather than sudden 
innovation.
56
 A conservative also sees the proper role of government as being the 
enforcement of ‘general rules of procedure upon all subjects alike....a specific and 
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limited activity; not the management of an enterprise, but the rule of those engaged 
in a great diversity of self-chosen enterprises.’57 This corresponds with Oakeshott’s 
own views on government and politics. For instance, he favours the understanding of 
the state as a civil association in terms of non-instrumental rules of conduct which, 
unlike the rules that define an enterprise, do not promote the achievement of a 
particular substantive purpose.
58
 Regarding change too there is an overlap between 
Oakeshott’s own view and the ‘conservative disposition’: Oakeshott is very critical 
of the Rationalist who falls into the error ‘of identifying the customary and the 
traditional with the changeless.’59 Change must occur, but what is required is ‘a 
principle of continuity: authority is diffused between past, present, and future; 
between the old, the new, and what is to come.’ 60    
Tocqueville also writes approvingly of tranquillity in politics.  A republic, 
for example, is a long-enduring institution because it is based on the ‘slow and 
tranquil action of society on itself....It is a conciliating government, in which 
resolutions ripen for a long time, are discussed slowly and executed only when 
mature.’61 The problem, however, is that democratic nations have an almost inherent 
yearning for change. Speaking of the constant evolution of the English language in 
America, Tocqueville notes, ‘Even when they do not have the need to change words, 
they sometimes feel the desire to do it.’62  
Tocqueville’s own ascent into national politics took place in a time of great 
flux: ‘Whichever way I looked, I could see nothing either solid or durable amid the 
general malaise affecting the nation; everybody wanted to get rid of the Constitution, 
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some through socialism, others by monarchy.’63 Though critical of the Socialists, he 
was clearly not of the Conservative faction which supported the monarchy either. 
Like Oakeshott, therefore, he was not of an existing Conservative Party although his 
was a conservative disposition and, in practical politics, his (and his associates’) 
main aim was to establish and prolong a republic ‘by governing in a methodical, 
moderate, conservative and completely constitutional manner.’ In fact, Tocqueville 
foresaw that this form of conservative disposition would not make him popular 
among the ‘official’ conservatives: the Monarchists.64 
 
Why be Conservative?  
The motivation for Oakeshott’s and Tocqueville’s discomfort with 
innovation and their distrust of ‘progressive’ programmes of change is a form of 
scepticism. This scepticism too is a disposition, not a well-articulated and definitive 
creed or doctrine. Indeed it would be apt to call it a personality. There are three ideas 
that people often conflate: ‘scepticism, the idea that no position is demonstrable; 
relativism, the idea that there is no absolute truth; and nihilism, the idea that all ideas 
are of equal value.’65 A sceptic, however, need not be a relativist or a nihilist. 
Oakeshott and Tocqueville are not relativists and have values which they defend 
strongly.  In a discussion on understanding and conduct (which will be taken up in 
detail towards the end of this chapter), Oakeshott states that although human 
understanding is independent from external forces, this ‘does not release his 
understanding from judgement in which it may be pronounced a 
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misunderstanding.’66 In other words, there is room for judgement and criticism of the 
understanding of others. Both Oakeshott and Tocqueville take definitive stances on 
several issues – they express value judgements and wish to convince others of these 
judgements too. Neither does Oakeshott’s and Tocqueville’s rejection of rationalism 
mean that they disparage reasoning. Oakeshott talks about ‘prudent diffidence rather 
than...radical doubt.’67 Reason has a proper – and important – place in politics: it is 
Rationalism itself that is unreasonable.
68
 In his reply to Professor Raphael defending 
his criticism of rationalism, Oakeshott denies that he holds that reason is foreign to 
politics. What he believes is that the reasoning apt for politics, and other forms of 
practical discourse, ‘will be of a different sort of explanatory reasoning – it will be of 
the sort appropriate, for example, to diagnosis, prescription and justification.’69 The 
error of rationalism is that it advocates an improper and highly exaggerated faith in a 
particular type of reason. Finally, on a practical level, their scepticism does not mean 
that Oakeshott and Tocqueville despise political (or religious) authority. Here also, 
like Montaigne, they value the authority of stable institutions and laws and the social 
order that comes with traditional mores. This is also the origin of their conservatism.   
Oakeshott is inspired by Michel de Montaigne in his attitude towards reason 
but Tocqueville also invokes Montaigne in his discussion of ‘self-interest well-
understood’.70 Both Tocqueville and Montaigne are pessimistic about the human 
ability and desire to follow virtue for virtue’s sake and thus both recommend linking 
virtue with happiness and profit, as a more effective way of promoting the former.
71
 
Though this is admittedly not a lofty ideal, it is ‘marvellously accommodating to the 
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weaknesses of men’, frailties which both authors were keenly aware of.72 In fact, 
Tocqueville’s tone becomes strikingly similar to Montaigne’s when Tocqueville 
‘wonder[s] at the imbecility of human reason’ and fickleness of our opinions.73    
In conclusion, society, like the individuals who compose it, is full of 
imperfections. Montaigne thinks these imperfections are an indispensable part of the 
natural order. Attempting to weed out every ill that society possesses would be 
destroying the ‘fundamental conditions of our life’.74 What would result would not 
be progress: ‘instead of changing into angels, they change into beasts; instead of 
raising themselves, they lower themselves.’ The results of these ‘transcendental 
humours’ which attempt to make men into angels frightens Montaigne.75 Like 
Montaigne, Oakeshott and Tocqueville are suspicious of grand programmes of 
change – politics that promise massive improvements to the human condition that 
aim at is some sort of temporal ‘salvation’. They are wary of the dangers of upheaval 
and the overthrowing of the status quo not because the past and the present is 
inherently nobler, nor because of considerations of some mystical ‘golden ages’ long 
gone and nostalgia for the past, but rather because of a lack of trust in man’s ability 
to control and guide tumultuous forces of change, and because of what such 
programmes of change might demand from the ruler and the citizen. Their 
conservatism therefore needs the ‘sceptical’ qualification. Calling them unqualified 
conservatives is unsatisfying and this is evident in the reluctance of many scholars in 
labelling them such. Chapter Two will examine Tocqueville’s and Oakeshott’s 
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scepticism in greater depth: what lies beneath this sceptical attitude and what form it 






SCEPTICISM IN POLITICS 
 
In this chapter I will discuss how Alexis de Tocqueville’s and Michael 
Oakeshott’s understanding of human character contributes to their conservative 
disposition. Tocqueville and Oakeshott are members of a collection of modern 
thinkers who reject the common tendency to lose focus of some of humankind’s 
characteristics (and their consequences in politics) and to focus solely (or 
predominantly) on social and economic structures in their diagnosis and attempted 
remedy of the ills that perennially beset human affairs.  They reject the unalloyed 
optimism of some strands of modern political philosophy and remind us that even 
with technology, and even once oppressive tyrants are deposed, man’s character can 
still ‘spoil’ things if we are not vigilant. 
 
Human Character in Oakeshott and Tocqueville 
The more familiar term in discussions like this is ‘human nature’ – and 
might almost do as well. However, ‘nature’, given its pedigree, carries with it several 
assumptions which do not fit very comfortably into a thesis on Oakeshott and 
Tocqueville.  
Firstly, while Oakeshott admires Catholic political philosophy (which he 
identifies as one of the four major social and political doctrines of modern Europe, 
along with Representative Democracy, Fascism and Marxism) for its coherence and 
even suggests that the historic doctrine of Conservatism can trace many of its 
principles to Catholic doctrine, Catholic political and social doctrine is something of 
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a ‘stranger in the modern world’ and Natural Law theory, though 'an element of 
profound importance in European tradition’, is often considered to be a relic of the 
past.
76
 Oakeshott is aware of the constant shifting of concepts, vocabulary and 
beliefs and perhaps is hesitant to pin his political beliefs on a concept that he 
considered rigid and inadaptable. Secondly, ‘human nature’, due to its close 
association with Natural Law theory, carries normative conclusions that I would be 
wary of pinning upon Oakeshott.  In fact, in the essay on the conservative disposition 
discussed in the previous chapter, Oakeshott distances himself somewhat from the 
argument that this conservative disposition is a deeply-rooted part of human nature. 
Though there seems to be a primordial propensity to conserve and to ‘cling to the 
familiar’, human inclinations wary across time and geographical space. For example, 
while younger children in general tend to be very unwilling to accommodate to 
changes, most adolescents are markedly more adventurous and open in their attitude 
towards changes. ‘There is, indeed, not much profit to be had from general 
speculation about “human nature”, which is no steadier than anything else in our 
acquaintance.’77  
On the other hand, understanding the human person and the inner 
motivations of human conduct is not a task Oakeshott despises. In a 1966 book 
review, he describes a book which explores human nature and its relevance to human 
community as ‘political philosophy at its scrupulous and unpretentious best.’78 How 
does one reconcile this? While he is hesitant about appeals to the deep-rootedness of 
certain characteristic in human nature, he is not closed to the idea of human nature 
itself. Rather, he considers it ‘more to the point to consider current human nature, to 
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consider ourselves.’79 What, then, is he is driving at? Is it that he does not like to 
generalize? To an extent – perhaps that is what he means by ‘to consider ourselves.’ 
But this does not preclude making any generalizations about human beings– 
‘ourselves’ to Oakeshott seems to include ‘our conduct during the last five 
centuries.’80  
There seems to be a paradox in what Oakeshott is saying: Looking at 
‘human nature’ many people are liable to think that a conservative disposition is 
deeply-rooted in us. Oakeshott, however, says that our conduct in the last five 
hundred years shows us to be ‘in love with change’.81 Perhaps this discrepancy can 
be explained thus: What we should not be doing is looking at the individual to 
deduce his inclinations and then extrapolating it as a general law for all mankind. 
Instead, what we could do, and what Oakeshott is doing, in order to understand how 
human beings tend to behave, is to observe the general human conduct one 
encounters through a study of history and draw from that our conclusions about 
human behaviour. Human beings have some basic traits – capacities and incapacities 
– in common. These however interact with circumstances which thus produce some 
variation over time and space. This gives a general sketch and leaves us with, not 
necessarily a solid normative theory but a character outline, a personality. This is 
contingent – based on Oakeshott’s historical observation rather than metaphysical 
theory.  
Tocqueville is also hesitant about making general statements but he 
recognizes the human need to rely on generalities. The very propensity to seek 
general explanations is a sign of man’s intellectual weakness: ‘General ideas do not 
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attest to the strength of human intelligence, but rather to its insufficiency.’82 They 
are imperfect tools because ‘there are no beings in nature exactly alike: no identical 
facts, no rules indiscriminately applicable in the same manner to several objects at 
once.’ However, ‘If the human mind undertook to examine and judge individually all 
the particular cases that strike it, it would soon be lost in the midst of the immensity 
of detail and would no longer see anything.’83 Note too that this has more than 
definitional implications: much of modern politics itself is based on the belief that 
general, abstract ideas can be directly applied to political decision-making. This 
point also speaks directly about Tocqueville’s scepticism towards the use of general 




The word ‘character’ is better suited to explaining Tocqueville’s 
understanding of the human person too. In speaking of a ‘religious terror’ at the 
events unfolding in Europe and North America, he is responding to concrete events 
that he sees unfolding before him.
85
 His conclusions on human tendencies are based 
on what he observed in his own political milieu in France, in his observation of the 
spectacle of American society and politics, and his understanding the French 
Revolution and history in general.  
The following overview of modern political thought aims to highlight how 
the topic of human nature or human character has increasingly been neglected in 
Western political discourse in favour of a refocusing of attention on the social and 
the structural, perhaps exacerbated by the belief that advances in technology allow 
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us to dispense of the caution that a keener awareness of human character would 
inspire. 
 
The Modern Optimist and the Side-lining of Human Character 
C.S. Lewis supports an increased flexibility in our conception of history and 
our idea of the lines of demarcation between various periods of history. Actual 
temporal process, Lewis notes, has no divisions. ‘Change is never complete, and 
change never ceases. Nothing is ever quite finished with; it may always begin over 
again....And nothing is quite new; it was always somehow anticipated or prepared 
for. A seamless, formless continuity-in-mutability is the mode of our life.’86 Lewis 
admits, however, that certain strands of thought wax and wane at various times in 
history and it is possible to identify and observe the changes in the dominant ideas 
over particular aggregations of temporality. 
 In his discussion on repositioning the frontier that had been drawn between 
the medieval and the renaissance, Lewis considers three possibilities before 
proposing his own: between Antiquity and the so-called Dark Ages, between the 
Dark Ages and the Middle Ages, and in the seventieth century between the Middle 
Ages and (let’s call it) the scientific age. None of these transitions brought with it as 
great a shift in political, religious, aesthetic, technological and psychological 
understanding as did the transition Lewis believes marks the Great Divide which he 
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What marks this transition is a change in psyche, best exemplified by the 
way we use the word ‘stagnation’, ‘with all its malodorous and malarial overtones’ 
for what used to be called ‘permanence’.88 Darwinism and the theory of evolution 
(as well as similar pre-Darwinian notions) contributed to this. But Lewis also argues 
that ‘what has imposed this climate of opinion so firmly on the human mind is a new 
archetypal image. It is the image of old machines being superseded by new and 
better ones.’89 This also explains the modern, perturbing assumption that everything 
is provisional and must be superseded, ‘that the attainment of goods we have never 
yet had, rather than the defence and conservation of that we have already, is the 
cardinal business of life.’90  
However, the changes that were evident in the nineteenth century had their 
roots centuries earlier. Though Lewis argues for the ‘Great Divide’ to be drawn 
somewhere in the nineteenth century, he does also admit that a marked change took 
place a century earlier. Why he did not go ahead and use the seventeenth century as 
the era of the Great Divide was because, though a great transition took place in that 
century, the changes were more or less limited to the area of philosophy and did not 
affect the ‘common mind’.  They would have profound effects – but these were 
delayed and were not evident during the seventeenth century.
91
 While passing it over 
as a candidate for the great dividing line of history, Lewis does admit, however, that 
‘if we were considering the history of though (in the narrower sense of the word) I 
believe this is where I would draw my line.’92 This thesis, however, is concerned 
with the history of thought in this narrower sense. So this seventeenth-century 
dividing line is an extremely useful one for us. The changes that began taking shape 
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during this time have been echoing down the centuries affecting both philosophy and 
practise among both the thinkers and the ‘common man’.  
Part of the change in thought that occurred around the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries concerned the way we looked at the human person and human 
activity. Prior to this period the concept of human nature was a primary concern of 
philosophy. This led thinkers – from Socrates to Augustine and Aquinas to 
Montaigne – to acquire at least a tinge of pessimism with regards to human affairs. 
The human person was ‘fallen’, his mental capacities were not perfect, he was ruled 
by his passions – these and similar idioms are representative of such a mindset. The 
modern philosophical age, on the other hand, is characterised by greater optimism 
concerning human ability, or at least potentiality. The concerns of this age have 
shifted away from pondering the human person and the limitations of his character 
and lie more on the structural issues – diagnosing the defects of society and aiming 
to solve these social problems. 
Again, let me reiterate that history cannot be neatly divided such that the 
first half is pessimistic and the second half is not, or with the first half being 
concerned about human nature and the second being enamoured by social issues. 
Both manners of thought are to be found throughout history. Pelagius’ optimism – 
his denial that human nature was wounded by original sin – led him to clash with St. 
Augustine of Hippo and other Catholic theologians. Realist thinkers like Reinhold 
Niebuhr and conservative philosophers like Edmund Burke preserve the pessimistic 
mindset in the modern context. They are, however, not the dominant voices – they 
are critics. The luminaries of each age mirrored the dominant philosophy of that age. 
The luminaries of the first age – thinkers like St. Augustine, Michel de Montaigne, 
and Niccolo Machiavelli – exhibited a pessimistic bent. And this pessimism was the 
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result of a great awareness of man’s historical and interior character. The luminaries 
of the modern age – a few of whom I will briefly examine in the next section – 
displayed a much greater interest in the condition and the moulding of society, a task 
which they were optimistic about because of an increased confidence in man’s his 
material (especially technological) capacity. 
An interesting formulation of this shift is seen in the writings of Jean-
Jacques Rousseau (1712-1788) who, unlike later philosophers, is not unconcerned 
with human nature: ‘It is of man that I have to speak...’93 Neither was he an 
unrestrained optimist of the kind one encounters later on. On the contrary, he was 
well aware of the evils around him: it was precisely the ‘intense awareness of man’s 
evil’ that motivated his philosophical endeavours.94 Rousseau’s anger at man’s 
condition is very palpable.
95
 It is his diagnosis that forms a point of departure from 
most of his predecessors. The source of evil, Rousseau believes, is not within man; 
man is naturally good.  
The break from his predecessors is made all the more evident when one 
considers the theories against which Rousseau pits himself. Though, in a sense, 
Rousseau can be considered to be attacking everyone who preceded him, Arthur 
Melzer identifies three primary opponents that Rousseau directs his criticisms 
against: ‘Christian thought, and especially the doctrine of original sin; early modern 
political theory, particularly the thought of Thomas Hobbes; and classical political 
philosophy, especially in its Platonic strain, with its starkly dualistic theory of human 
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nature.’ Melzer comments that these three categories do, indeed, cover nearly all of 
the Western tradition until that time.
96
  
Man is born good; it is society and civilization that corrupts him: ‘nature 
made men happy and good but society depraves him and makes him miserable.’97 
Thus while Rousseau shares some part of his predecessors’ pessimism, he 
champions two novel elements – the belief that humans are, by nature, essentially 
good, and that society is the source of human misfortune. What follows is that, when 
tackling social problems, one can, and in fact must, ignore human nature. To 
successfully improve the human condition, attention must be focused on fixing 
society. Obviously, this implies that society can be fixed and that is nothing 
intrinsically broken about the human condition that cannot be fixed.  
However, it is impossible – at least for the vast majority of us - to strip 
away civilization and return to the existence of the noble savage. This solution is 
available only to a few individuals and is unhelpful when considering society at 
large. For this one must move in the very opposite direction of collectivism.
98
 This is 
what Melzer calls Rousseau’s political – as opposed to his individualistic – solution. 
‘Political rule, legitimate force, must thus be used to save me from myself, to free 
me from the dangers of my own inexpungeable selfishness.’99 Through the state, the 
citizen ‘will be forced to be free. For this is the condition that...guarantees him 
against all personal dependence’.100 ‘Rousseau is thus a wholehearted “statist”. By 
forcibly repressing (as well as partially transforming) man’s natural selfishness, the 
legitimate state is the true and indispensable agent of man’s salvation.’101 Also, 
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given the difficult task it has in tackling what is a natural, and intractable, 
characteristic of man, state force must be expanded, making Rousseau not only a 
statist, but also an extreme absolutist.
102
  
Francis Bacon’s (1561-1626) New Atlantis falls under the literary genre of 
utopias and is an account of a distant island – Bensalem – whose citizens had 
managed, through science and legislation to eradicated many of the social and 
physical ills that plagued (and still plague today) the rest of civilized society (which 
to Bacon would mainly comprise the states of Europe).  Iconic of Bacon’s attitude 
towards human nature and society (and evidence that the previously mentioned shift 
was underway as early as the sixteenth century) is Bensalem’s understanding of the 
family. Human structures are valued for the benefits they bring to society. Family is 
celebrated by the citizens of Bensalem precisely (or only?) because the institution of 
marriage provides new citizens. The ‘Feast of the Family’ is an honour granted to 
‘any man that shall live to see thirty persons descend of his body all together and all 
above the age of three.’103 Such a man provides so great a service to King and 
country that he is honoured in the title of ‘well beloved friend and creditor’ – a title 
of great distinction and uniqueness because ‘the king is debtor to no man, but for the 
propagation of his subjects.’104  
Bacon places in his utopia an institution called Salomon’s House 
(something like the British Royal Society) which is called the ‘noblest 
foundation...that was ever upon the earth; and the lanthorn of this kingdom’ – 
dedicated to the study of the ‘works and Creatures of God’.105 Its pursuit of light, 
‘God’s first creature’ – is not a pursuit which is undertaken solely for the love of 
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knowledge in itself, but is put into very practical use in larger society.
106
 It is not just 
in Salomon’s House that science is alive – Salomon’s House is its heart, but the 
entire Bensalemite society, its marriage laws for example, reflect the pervasiveness 
of the scientific spirit. To Bacon, then, the ills of mankind are solved through science 
and technology itself but also (and perhaps primarily) through an attitude of 
scientific rationalism. No wonder therefore that New Atlantis, and Bacon’s lifework 
as a whole, is seen as an advertisement for the utility of devoting a portion of a 
nation’s resources to scientific endeavour.107  
Science also confers power – a power Bacon imagines is benevolent. 
Though the ancient King Salomona features prominently in Bacon’s travelogue, the 
man currently on the throne of the city is never mentioned. Those who seem to bear 
power are the scientists of Salomon’s House.  The description of the state entrance 
of one such member, right from the his splendid attire and retinue to the fact that he 
holds up his hand in benediction as he travels through the streets lined with the 
people of Bensalem, indicates the power that these men possess. It is noteworthy that 
these men have the power of benediction. Thus, although Bensalem has Christian 
priests, the members of Salomon’s House seem to have annexed the role of the priest 
as well as the ruler.  
The Magnalia Naturae
108
 – attached to New Atlantis – lists a range of 
discoveries that benefit mankind, ranging from the prolongation of life, the 
manipulation of nature and  the creation of new kinds of foods and to ‘natural 
divinations, deception of the senses [and] greater pleasure for the senses.’109 What is 
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missing from this list is any mention of the study of philosophy and an attempt to 
understand the human soul and mind. Nor was it necessary for this field of study to 
be emphasised for this is an era that would witness ‘the victory for art in its race 
against nature’.110  The dawn of the age of science and technology brought with it 
the vision of new, previously incomprehensible dominion of man over the rest of 
material creation. Pointing the lens inwards at oneself seemed irrelevant and even 
discouraging.  In the midst of this new hopefulness it is understandable that 
mankind’s flaws and weaknesses – manifest both in Greek tragedy and the 
pessimistic Christian doctrine of original sin – were forgotten. Man need not await 
the afterlife for weakness and suffering to be banished; salvation seemed available 
within temporality. There is no sign of sickness in Bensalem, and, even more 
strikingly, no evidence of strife and violence either. In this way it is a restoration, not 
so much of the primeval Garden of Eden, but an Eden nonetheless: a modern 
paradise of science and technology.  
Rousseau’s idea that we are born free and that it is society that puts us in 
chains, the belief that freedom, once achieved, would express itself in happiness and 
brotherhood, and Bacon’s faith in progress played a large role in events of the 
French Revolution of 1798. Roger Scruton says that it was the philosophy of 
Rousseau ‘that led to the following utterance of Mirabeau, who died before seeing it 
refuted: “General liberty will rid the world of the absurd oppressions that overwhelm 
humanity. It will give rise to a rebirth of that universal brotherhood without which 
all public and private benefit is so uncertain and precarious.”’111 Just a short while 
later Maximilien Robespierre was establishing his ‘despotism of liberty’, and 
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‘cutting off any head that had a problem with it.’ The final death toll of about two 
million left the entire continent of Europe embroiled in warfare that was to ‘destroy 
the hopes of more reasonable people’.112  
This terrible failure was indicative of the fact that those who claimed to 
govern strictly by reason were not exempt from the irrational and even murderous 
tendencies that have always plagued human affairs. Scruton expresses an intense 
puzzlement at why not even a tiny dose of pessimism entered these wild pursuers of 
‘liberation’. The events of the French Revolution which, on hindsight at least, ought 
to have refuted modernity’s unscrupulous optimism for all future generations, was 
instead ‘reinterpreted as heralding the liberation of humanity from its oppressors. 
The very same fallacy can be read in subsequent calls to revolution by the Marxists, 
by Lenin and Mao, by Satre and Pol Pot, for all of whom the French Revolution was 
one step on the way to the goal of emancipation.’113  
The Europe in which Friedrich Engels and Karl Marx lived, and against 
which they directed their incisive social critique, had undergone great 
transformations due to the development and use of technology. Technology, 
however, was not the panacea that Bacon had imagined it to be. A new class of 
people had been created: the modern working class or the proletarians. This class of 
workers lived ‘only as long as they find work’.114  They had lost their sense of 
dignity, and the dignity gained from their work, they had been deprived of their 
individuality, they were ‘forced to sell themselves like piecemeal’, treated as ‘a 
commodity, like every other article of commerce’ and had ‘become an appendage of 
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the machine’.115 Marx and Engels, however, do not lose faith in progress itself.  
Their diagnosis points to ills in society as the reason why progress had not brought 
about happiness. And this is where their prescriptions for change lie too. Radical 
social evils required a radical social prescription, and the communists called for 
revolution.  
Marx’s call for the workers of the world to unite and throw off their chains 
was successfully carried out in Russia. However, the Communist Manifesto, though 
detailed and incisive in its historical analysis and social critique, is very vague with 
regards to what would happen after the fall of the bourgeoisie state. Communism 
talks of a ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ which would merely be a transitional phase 
that follows the fall of the old capitalist regime.
116
 Being temporary, this would soon 
be abolished and replaced by a classless communist society; the state would ‘wither 
away’, to use Lenis’ famous phrase.117 However, there was no elaboration as to how 
this social condition would be achieved. Probably there is an assumption that once 
the root causes were put right, society would order itself automatically. Of course 
Soviet Russia’s experiment with communism proved that reality was not as Marx 
had predicted it would be. Marx’s failure was also in believing that creating a 
favourable economic environment would solve the grave social ills he observed 
around him.  
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Modern scientific and technological abilities have advanced the state’s 
physical capabilities.
118
 Technology has also altered man’s beliefs about himself. But 
optimism and hubris are not modern maladies. The difference is that today it is seen 
as less problematic. Modern man thinks that he can afford to take himself more 
seriously. Oakeshott, however – and unpopular for his time – ‘kept his eye fixed on 
the seductive temptation of pridefulness endemic to the human condition.’119 He also 
warns about a ‘philosophy of indifferentism’ which is uninterested in the great 
questions on human life, turning instead to politics, science and business.
120
 
Tocqueville too was convinced that man’s opinions of himself and his achievements 
were more grandiose than should have been.  
 
The Fall 
Oakeshott likens the profound myths of a civilization to a collective dream; 
for a member of civilization to participate in that civilization is to participate in the 
collective dream. For western civilization in Thomas Hobbes’ time, it was the story 
of the Fall and of original sin that was the collective dream. Oakeshott describes it 
thus: ‘The human race, and the world it inhabits...sprang from the creative act of 
God, and was as perfect as its creator. But, by an original sin, mankind became 
separated from the source of its happiness and peace. This sin was Pride, the 
perverse exaltation of the creature, by which man became a god to himself.’121 
Oakeshott disagrees with those who read Hobbes as being a definitive break from 
medieval philosophy and who see Leviathan as a replacement of the Christian 
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understanding of the human condition by an altogether different myth. Instead what 
Oakeshott detects is the overemphasis of one portion of the myth of original sin 




‘Pride and sensuality, the too much and the too little – these are the poles 
between which, according to our dream, human life swings.’ The subtlety of the 
Christian understanding ‘lay in the fineness of its perception of these extremes and 
the imaginative power with which it filled the space between.’123 In the myth of the 
Fall of Man, there is perhaps a partiality towards the ‘too much’ – man must have 
been an exalted creature before the Fall. Leviathan emphasises the opposite pole. 
Hobbes’ myth ‘recalls man to his littleness, his imperfection, his mortality, while at 
the same time recognizing his importance to himself.’124 This myth seems to have 
often been forgotten in our politics. Perhaps this can be blamed on science, whose 
project, Oakeshott points out, is the destruction of all myth.
125
 Oakeshott must have 
detected this – which is why his life’s work included trying to raise breakwaters 
against the tide of what was claimed to be ‘science’, under the disfigurement of 
Rationalism, sweeping in to the field of politics. The project of destroying the myth 
and waking mankind from its dreams, Oakeshott warns, if fully achieved, would 
result not merely in us awakening to ‘a profound darkness’, but also to ‘a dreadful 
insomnia’ settling over mankind.126  
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The Tower of Babel 
Another central myth of mankind is that of the Tower of Babel.
 
Retold in 
the narratives of several civilizations, it is the version of the Hebrews, found in the 
Old Testament, that is the most famous. It is, like all other ‘proper stories’, ‘the 
expression of some unchanging human predicament.’127 The myth encapsulates, and 
explains, the experiences of the ancient civilizations as well as some of the famous 
tales of the Western world: Faust, Don Juan, and the Arthurian legend.  
What arrests the attention at the beginning of Oakeshott’s vivid retelling of 
the myth is the ‘limitless wants and...the savage urge to satisfy them’ that 
characterises the human race.
128
 ‘Careless of its beauty, contemptuous of its gifts and 
persuaded of its hostility, they laid waste the world, seeking only to gratify their 
perverse and insatiable desires. And their relations with their fellow men followed 
the same pattern: they were animated by greed, envy, fear and violence.’129 We see 
Hobbes’ influence permeating this picture of the human condition. After the Biblical 
flood, Oakeshott’s story focuses on one man: Nimrod, the great-grandson of Noah. 
Oakeshott makes mention of a magical garment which Nimrod inherited from his 
grandfather Ham. The garment can be seen as an allegory of hubris: ‘Vested in this 
garment, Nimrod not only felt himself to be a fine fellow, but believed himself to be 
invincible.’130 Nonetheless, Nimrod knew that he was not in total control of events, 
that Providence and the forces of nature were not guaranteed to favour him all the 
time. His character was such that dealing emphatically with this insecurity became 
an obsession. It was thus that the idea of building a tower materialized. It was 
Nimrod’s plan to ‘make ourselves for ever secure from the hostility of both God and 
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nature.’ This ‘titanic assault upon heaven...a cosmic revolution’ was not only 
doomed to failure but also entailed ‘the destruction of all the virtues and 
consolations of the vita temporalis, a destruction of which the “confusion of 
tongues” is the emblem.’131  
It is interesting to note that while Nimrod’s refusal to accept moral 
boundaries caused such destruction, there is something tragically heroic about his 
fate. The base wants of the populace on the other hand – the sensuality which fed 
their leader’s pride – is an attitude of slavishness and is particularly dishonourable. 
In an essay on the masses in representative democracy, and in On Human Conduct, 
Oakeshott calls this character the ‘individual manqué’ who is intent not on pursuing 
happiness but only of enjoying happiness.
132
 Their leaders spoke to them ‘in the 
language of millennial expectation, and the prospect they dangled before him... 
[was] the promise of salvation: a world from which all that convicted him of 
inadequacy had been miraculously removed.’133 Thus, there are even differing 
reasons for hubris: anger at a perceived ‘social’ injustice (which seems to be what 
motivated Nimrod) and the lust for power (which seems to be what drove some of 
the leaders Oakeshott talks about in his essay). Both these motivations share a 
common disregard for any limits – moral, political, religious. And it is both hubris 
and sensuality that drove the Babelians to destruction.  
 
Perfectibility in the Age of Democracy 
Human perfectibility and an exalted belief in human reason were defining 
features of the French Revolution and its intellectual motivation, the French 
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Enlightenment. Gertrude Himmelfarb argues that the French Enlightenment was 
markedly different from the American and British Enlightenments. One major 
difference was in their attitude towards reason, the human mind, and the human 
character in general. Himmelfarb’s description of the iconic texts of the French and 
American Enlightenments bears testimony to this. The French Encyclopedie was 
highly ambitious; it aimed at being a catalogue of universal knowledge. The 
American Federalist had no such grand pretensions: it contained opinions and ideas 
for a specific purpose, and a specific country. Its reflections on human nature and 




Tocqueville does not consider the belief in perfectibility to be a modern 
one. It is in man’s very character: man resembles animals in almost all points, but 
‘one feature is peculiar to him alone: he perfects himself.’ Man discovered this 
difference very early on. ‘The idea of perfectibility is therefore as old as the world.’ 
While the idea of perfectibility does not owe the new phenomenon of equality its 
discovery, equality did give the idea ‘a new character.’135 Democracy and equality 
brought a decisive change with regards to perfectibility. Aristocratic peoples do not 
deny the idea of human perfectibility. However, they ‘do not judge it to be indefinite; 
they conceive of improvement, not change.’ They believe in betterment, but not in 
major change, and, while they admit ‘that humanity has made great progress and that 
it can make still more, they confine it in advance within certain impassable limits.’136  
Democracy, David Hiley argues, is a ‘collectively critical process of 
consensus formation’, a process which is never complete. Therefore ‘uncertainly and 
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doubt constitute the epistemic field, so to speak, of democratic citizenship.’137 
According to Tocqueville, however, it is in democracies – where self-doubt is a pre-
requisite – that belief in perfectibility really takes flight. Certainly, failures remind 
the democratic citizen that they are not infallible and that they have not yet attained 
the absolute good. But the old, aristocratic limitations disappear and ‘the image of an 
ideal and always fugitive perfection is presented to the human mind.’138  
 
The Gamble of Rationalism 
Oakeshott examines a variant of the belief in perfectibility in another 
interpretation of the myth of the Tower of Babel in a second essay of the same title. 
In this retelling he sees the building of the tower as a figure for the ‘impious and 
unavoidable’ activity of ‘finding a short cut to heaven’ and ‘the pursuit of perfection 
as the crow flies.’139 The penalties of these activities are impiety (‘the anger of the 
gods and social isolation’) and its rewards are that of having aimed at and attempted 
perfection, rather than any actual attainment (for such perfection lies beyond man). 
‘It is an activity, therefore, suitable for individuals, but not for societies.’140 In other 
words, ‘human life is a gamble; but while the individual must be allowed to bet 
according to his inclination....society should always back the field.’141  
Useful at this juncture are the two conceptions of the moral life that 
Oakeshott identifies. The first sees morality as ‘a habit of affection and behaviour’ 
and is distinguished from the second by being a reaction to the ‘current situations of 
normal life...not by consciously applying to ourselves a rule of behaviour, nor by 
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conduct recognized as the expression of a moral idea, but by acting in accordance 
with a certain habit of behaviour.’142 This form of moral activity can be said to be 
humble – it is the product, not of lofty ideas, on ‘rules or precepts learned by heart 
and subsequently practised’, but rather of actually ‘living with people who habitually 
behave in a certain manner.’143 From the point of view of both the individual and 
society, this form or morality has the advantage of giving great stability to the moral 
life: ‘it is not in its nature to countenance large or sudden changes in the kinds of 
behaviour it desiderates.’ 144 It is elastic, and the changes it undergoes are organic: 
‘...habits of moral conduct show no revolutionary changes because they are never at 
rest.’145 Oakeshott does warn though that a moral life comprising only of 
unconscious habit has danger of degenerating into superstition.
146
  
The second form of the moral life involves the ‘reflective application of a 
moral criterion’ whose ‘distinctive virtue is to be subjecting behaviour to a 
continuous corrective analysis and criticism.’147 One consequence of this form of 
morality is that ‘when the guide to conduct is a moral ideal we are never suffered to 
escape from perfection. Constantly, indeed on all occasions, society is called upon to 
seek virtue as the crow flies.’148 Oakeshott cautions us of the dangers of such an 
attitude. A morality of ideals attains stability through inelasticity: a moral life based 
on moral ideals has great capacity to withstand change, but once the resistance is 
broken down, ‘what takes place is not change but revolution – rejection and 
replacement.’149 This makes a moral life based on ideals ‘dangerous in an individual 
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and disastrous in a society. For an individual it is a gamble which may have its 
rewards when undertaken within the limits of a society which is not itself engaged in 
the gamble; for a society it is a mere folly.’150  
Oakeshott believes that Rationalism, which can be associated with this 
second form of morality, became the dominant ‘intellectual fashion’ of post-
Renaissance Europe. ‘By one road or another, by conviction, by its supposed 
inevitability, by its alleged success, or even quite unreflectively, almost all politics 
today have become Rationalist or near-Rationalist.’151 This ‘surrender’ to 
Rationalism is almost all-encompassing and the entire attitude of mind of European 
politics has become rationalistic.
152
 The Rationalist (an ideal type) never doubts the 
power of his ‘reason’ – a reason he believes is common to all mankind - when 
properly applied, to judge the worth of a thing, the truth of an opinion and the 
propriety of an action. Despite his belief in the universality of ‘reason’ however, he 
is an individualist, finding it difficult to accept that anyone who can think honestly 
and clearly will think differently from himself.
153
 He has no sense of the cumulation 
of experience: experience is useful to him only once it has been conceived as a 
formula, a set of principles that must stand the test of ‘reason’.154 In the realm of 
politics much of rationalist political activity takes the form of ‘subjecting the social, 
political, legal and institutional inheritance of his society before the tribunal of his 
intellect; the rest is rational administration.’155  
The belief in the availability of a ‘rational’ solution also makes the 
Rationalist a perfectionist: ‘the “rational” solution for any problem is, in its nature, 














the perfect solution.’ This leads to a refusal to accept the messiness of settling for the 
‘best solution in the circumstances’ because ‘the function of reason is precisely to 
surmount circumstances.’ Moreover, since there is available only one best solution – 
one best form of government, of societal relationship – one can come to expect 
uniformity among rational beings regarding these issues.
156
 Oakeshott quotes 
William Godwin in this regard: ‘There must in the nature of things be one best form 
of government which all intellects, sufficiently roused from the slumber of savage 
ignorance, will be irresistibly incited to approve.’157 While more modest Rationalists 
might not be so bold as to make such extreme general statements, they do hold to 
this principle, at least in the particulars. In fact even the resistance to this politics of 
rational planning itself bears the marks of Rationalism. ‘It seems that now, in order 
to participate in politics and expect a hearing, it is necessary to have, in the strict 
sense, a doctrine; not to have a doctrine appears frivolous, even disreputable.’158 
This provides another explanation as to why Oakeshott was not a proponent of party 
political platforms. 
Rationalism was involved in the great drama of Tocqueville’s era too: the 
French Revolution. Examining the social and political factors that led to the French 
Revolution, Tocqueville notices differences in the intellectual atmospheres of Britain 
and France. Unlike British men of letters, the literary-minded in France kept steadily 
aloof from the political arena. ‘Nevertheless, they did not (like most of their German 
contemporaries) resolutely turn their backs on politics and retire to a world apart, of 
belles lettres and pure philosophy.’ On the contrary, they took a very keen interest in 










 The political programmes advocated by these eighteenth-century French 
thinkers had a common source: ‘the belief that what was wanted was to replace the 
complex of traditional customs governing the social order of the day by simple, 
elementary rules deriving from the exercise of the human reason and natural law.’160 
The French Revolution was nothing less than a moral revolution, a total revolution 
of sentiment and sensibility penetrating into every aspect of life. Himmelfarb, like 
Tocqueville, traces this characteristic of the French Enlightenment back to the 
intellectuals of the time – the philosophes. What was so unique about the 
philosophes was not just their penchant for abstract principles but the particular 
principle that they based their ideas upon: Reason.
161
 That word, Himmelfarb says, is 
repeated constantly and in the most varied of contexts, serving ‘as a mantra, a token 
of good faith and right-mindedness.’162 Tocqueville speaks (in a unimpressed tone 
that is strongly echoed in the voice of Oakeshott when he writes about Rationalism) 
about a  
‘fondness for broad generalizations, cut-and-dried legislative systems, 
and a pedantic symmetry;...contempt for hard facts...taste for 
reshaping institutions on novel, ingenious, original lines...desire to 
reconstruct the entire constitution according to the rules of logic and a 
preconceived system instead of trying to rectify its faulty parts.’  
The result, he concludes, ‘was nothing short of disastrous’.163  
Tocqueville believes that the societal conditions of the time were such that a 
rationalist outlook on government was not surprising. The thinkers of the eighteenth 
                                                          
159
 Alexis de Tocqueville, The Old Regime and the French Revolution, trans. Stuart Gilbert 
(New York: Doubleday, 1955), 138-139. (OR) 
160
 Ibid. 139. 
161
 Gertrude Himmelfarb , The Roads to Modernity (2004),  151 and Alexis de Tocqueville, 
OR, 140. 
162
 Gertrude Himmelfarb , The Roads to Modernity (2004),  151. 
163
 Alexis de Tocqueville, OR, 147. 
 45 
century looked around them and the absurdity and injustice of the existing order, ‘so 
many ridiculous, ramshackle institutions, survivals of an earlier age’ which had not 
evolved with changing circumstances that ‘it was natural enough that thinkers of the 
day should come to loathe everything that savoured of the past and should desire to 
remould society on entirely new lines, traced by each thinker in the sole light of 
reason.’164 Society had failed to, and perhaps had forgotten how to, change within a 
tradition, how to patch up, reform and repair social institutions. Arising from such a 
milieu were the rationalist men of letters who could not recognize change and 
improvement unless it was self-consciously induced change that sought to destroy 
and remake rather than reform.
165
 This is the error that Oakeshott identifies among 
Rationalists: that of identifying the customary and the traditional with the 
changeless.  
‘There is, of course, no question either of retaining or improving such 
a tradition, for both these involve an attitude of submission. It must be 
destroyed. And to fill its place the Rationalist puts something of his 
own making – an ideology, the formalized abridgement of the 
supposed substratus of rational truth contained in the tradition.’166  
Tocqueville mentions that this train of thought was not something 
completely new: ‘it had haunted men’s imaginations off and on for three 
millennia.’167 However, it was not until this period that it became accepted as a basic 
principle, ‘the driving force of a political passion to such an extent that general and 
abstract theories of the nature of human society not only became daily topics of 
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conversation among the leisure class but fired the imagination even of women and 
peasants.’168  
These men of letters who were ‘without wealth, social eminence, 
responsibilities, or official status, became in practice the leading politicians of the 
age’. While others held the reins of government ‘they alone spoke with accents of 
authority.’169 Thus, in France there developed a group of powerful intellectuals 
whose influence in politics exceeded that of the professional politicians.  
‘One of these carried on the actual administration while the other set 
forth abstract principles on which good government should, they 
said, be based; one took the routine measures appropriate to the 
needs of the moment, the other propounded general laws without a 
thought for their practical application; one group shaped the course 
of public affairs, the other that of public opinion.’170  
Both Oakeshott and Tocqueville hint at the same cause for this change. 
Oakeshott identifies in Rationalism the belief in the sovereignty of technique to the 
detriment of any concern for practice. Rationalism, Oakeshott says ‘is the assertion 
that, properly speaking, there is no knowledge that is not technical knowledge’ able 
to be written down in the form of a manual containing rules, principles, directions 
and so on.
171
 Practical knowledge, denied by Rationalists, is the knowledge that 
exists only in use; it cannot be formulated in rules. Oakeshott then homes in on the 
reason why technical politics was received with such open arms: it was related to the 
replacement of well-established hereditary ruling families with ‘new’ princes, men 
like the Medici who came to rule without a tradition of statecraft or family 
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experience. ‘Lacking education (except in the habits of ambition), and requiring 
some short-cut to the appearance of education, he required a book...of a certain sort; 
he needed a crib....a technique for the ruler who had no tradition.’172 And just like 
the new prince needed a book to teach him politics, so did the new and politically 
inexperienced social classes which gained political authority over the subsequent 
centuries. ‘None of these classes had time to acquire a political education before it 
came to power; each needed a crib, a political doctrine, to take the place of a habit of 
political behaviour.’173  
This is exactly how Tocqueville diagnoses it as well. The eighteenth-
century French were a people who had forgotten the habits of political behaviour. ‘If 
the French people had still played an active part in politics (through the Estates-
General) or even if they had merely continued to concern themselves with the day-
to-day administration of affairs through the provincial assemblies, we may be sure 
that they would not have let themselves be carried away so easily by the ideas of the 
writers of the day; any experience, however slight, of public affairs would have made 
them wary of accepting the opinions of mere theoreticians.’174 The French 
aristocracy had lost its power and its prestige as a shaper of public opinion and were 
under pressure from the Crown who mistakenly identified it as its greatest threat. 
The French nation as a whole had been excluded from the conduct of its own affairs 
and thus lacking in political experience were unable to reform their ancient 
institutions. One important argument contained in Old Regime is that this 
Rationalism directly contributed to the undermining of the entire French political 
system and precipitated the Revolution. 
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Untamed History: the problem of unintended consequences 
Tocqueville rarely states it in so many words, but the myth of the Tower of 
Babel plays itself out in the events of his own time as well. The tragedy (or the 
greater tragedy) is this: intellectuals may be able to set historical processes in 
motion, but eventually no man is able to control the forces of history. What occurs is 
an avalanche – caused by a group of men, with beginnings that looked very much 
within their control. In the case of the French Revolution, this capriciousness played 
itself out in a very short period of time. The most striking lesson from Old Regime is 
that grand schemes can – and often will – fail. There was extreme centralization 
before the storming of the Bastille, and, once the dust from the revolution had 
settled, there was even more extreme administrative centralization, just under 
another group government, supposedly for the cause of liberté. This was obviously 
not what the large majority of revolutionaries risked their lives for.  
This inability to control the events we help unleash is why great change is 
worrisome to Tocqueville. The events that were carrying the ‘Christian peoples of 
our day’ were already too strong to be suspended; skill and effort (and caution) must 
be exerted in directing (rather than controlling) them. Tocqueville’s vision of his 
contemporaries’ reaction to the onward surge of history is stark: ‘placed in the 
middle of a rapid river, we obstinately fix our eyes on some debris that we still 
perceive on the bank, while the current carries us away and takes us backwards 
toward the abyss.’175 Here there is a criticism of the reactionaries of his time, but it 
also paints a bleak picture of ‘progress’. ‘The abyss is a metaphor of loss meant for 
Frenchmen, a reminder of the destructiveness set in motion by the Great 
Revolution....The image of being carried “backward” was a discordant one to an age 
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accustomed to rhapsodize progress.’176 Probably as a result of what happened in 
France, Tocqueville does not give the American Revolution a central causal role in 
the success of the American experiment.  
The same pattern of events repeated itself several times in the centuries that 
followed. The communist revolutions themselves, and the various grand projects 
devised by the leaders of the U.S.S.R. and China, for example, should have taught 
the world this lesson the hard way. The Great Leap Forward for example should 
have driven home the message of the futility and misery that can accompany such 
schemes of ‘progress’. However despite, or perhaps because of, the immensity of 
these social cataclysms, they have done little to dampen our optimism about less 
epic, but essentially similar, adventures. An unquestioning faith in progress still 
lingers in politics – a faith which is ready to topple institutions and tolerate great 
concentrations of power in the state for the sake of fashioning laws, and society, 
along the ideals of ‘reason’ and ‘progress’. The Neoconservative movement, with its 
belief that ideals like democracy can be transplanted to the far corners of the globe, 
through the use of arms if necessary, or through coercive economic policies, and 
even through the use of aid regimens, displays this mode of thinking. The 
unpredictability of the fruits of such utopian endeavours is evidenced in the descent 
of countries like Iraq into nightmarish sectarian bloodshed. A similar vision drives 
the project of European integration, when one considers the instances of great 
democratic deficit and the vast and confidently-made institutional plans, the current 
unravelling of which is met with calls for even greater centralization and integration.  
While Tocqueville felt assured that dangerous administrative centralization 
was absent from the US of his time
177
, Sheldon Wolin, in Democracy Incorporated, 
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argues that the country has been undergoing a subtle but perilous transformation: it 
is becoming a ‘managed democracy’. Totalitarianism, according to Wolin, can 
develop in forms that are not exhaustively represented by its most extreme 
mutations: Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia.178 ‘Inverted totalitarianism’, unlike 
classical totalitarianism, has developed not through the imposition of an individual 
will or the elimination of opposition in a failed democracy, but through changes, 
especially in the economy, of a strong democracy, ‘that promoted integration, 
rationalization, concentrated wealth, and a faith that virtually any problem – from 
health care to political crises, even faith itself – could be managed, that is subjected 
to control, predictability, and cost-effectiveness in the delivery of the product.’179. 
While this phenomenon, which seems to be an equivalent to ‘corporatism’, shares 
with other forms of totalitarianism an aspiration towards unlimited power and 
expansionism, its workings are very different from classical totalitarianism. Such an 
‘inversion’ is present, Wolin says, ‘when a system, such as a democracy, produces a 
number of significant actions ordinarily associated with its antithesis’. As an 
example Wolin give the instance of an elected leader ordering imprisonments 
without trials and sanctioning torture while at the same time talking – and even 
instructing – the nation and the world about the sanctity of the rule of law.180 Writing 
during the presidency of George W. Bush, Wolin focuses his criticism on the 
Republican Party (they come across as zealous and radical anti-democrats while the 
Democrats are portrayed as timid centrists).
181
 Unsurprisingly, the actions Obama 
administration have proven to be just as worrisome. Take for example the news that 
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President Obama ‘has placed himself at the helm of a top secret “nominations” 
process to designate terrorists for kill or capture, of which the capture part has 
become largely theoretical’ while refusing to allow judicial review or even revealing 
what the process of authorizing assassinations involved.
182
 Even more disconcerting 
is one instance of the twisting of vocabulary involved in this process: the number of 
civilian causalities was not significantly high because of the strange method that is 
used to count civilian casualties. All military-age males in the strike zone are by 
default counted as combatants ‘unless there is explicit intelligence posthumously 
proving them innocent.’183 What underlies such great acquisition of power Wolin 
calls ‘the Utopian theory of Superpower’, a utopianism that has come to the forefront 
during the so-called ‘struggle against global terrorism.’184 In summary, the 
management of democracy and the utopian idea of Superpower have lead to an 
‘inverted totalitarianism’ that is as totalising as classical totalitarianism, but not as 
obvious because it is based on political disengagement (as opposed to the excessive 
politicisation of classical totalitarianism), the weakening of most political institutions 
and the strengthening of corporate and commercial institutions. This is the ‘politics 
of faith’ that Oakeshott describes and which will be discussed in detail later.     
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Free Will and Liberty 
European integration was first formulated as an antidote to war and has 
since expanded and united to form a normative and political entity. The EU’S 
centralizing treaties and regulations are aimed at upholding these norms and 
deepening the bonds of friendship and common action among the member states. 
The US government claims that a strong executive is necessary to combat global 
terrorism and sees its foreign policy as promoting ‘freedom, democracy, and free 
enterprise’ around the world.185 Benign, or even meritorious, aims surely? Then what 
exactly is the argument against these developments?  
Human beings can be ridiculous, vain, prideful and violent; but this should 
not make us lose sight of humankind’s dignity. Without an awareness of what makes 
us unique, what dignity we share, scepticism could justify pragmatism, realism and 
even accommodate naked power politics. Though his great work is titled Democracy 
in America, human dignity and liberty, and not specifically democracy, were 
Tocqueville’s own great passion.186 However, it is Oakeshott who has the more 
systematic philosophical exposition of human dignity and its relationship with 
liberty, so he will provide the framework for this discussion on free will and liberty. 
Human conduct – as opposed to animal behaviour – is never an absolute 
response to stimuli, it is not based only on instinct, inheritance, the external 
environment, or the events of one’s life (one’s ‘history’).  Human conduct has an 
ingredient that makes the human person unique: he possesses an understanding of his 
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actions and responses that is based on a reflective consciousness and is therefore not 
wholly dependent on externalities. 
 ‘[I]n virtue of an agent being a reflective consciousness, his actions 
and utterances are the outcomes of what he understands his situation 
to be, and this understanding cannot be “reduced” to a component of a 
genetic, a biochemical, a psychological or any other process, or to a 
consequence of a causal condition.’187  
This human trait is what makes man a free agent. This ‘formal detachment from 




Now this is different to another quality which is often called ‘freedom’: 
self-determination or autonomy. The ‘“freedom” inherent in agency’ is, as the word 
‘inherent’ suggests, not something that he has to strive for, that he can be denied. 
Even with a gun pointed at his head, a person can freely choose not to comply with 
the demands of his armed assailant. Certainly, such a refusal could prove to be 
extremely costly, but the point is, no amount of power disparity can rob a human 
being of his free will. The reasons against refusing might be extremely compelling, 
but they are not absolute. In principle, an agent can resist these reasons.
189
 Of course 
the threatened person can comply, and, under duress, act absolutely contrary to his 
wishes. Here, what he has lost is his autonomy, or what Tocqueville calls ‘liberty’. 
But he is still free. A person is therefore ‘not “free” because he is able (or because he 
believes himself to be able) to “will” what he shall do or say; he is “free” because his 
response to his situation...is the outcome of an intelligent engagement.’ It is this 
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‘intelligence in doing’ that we call ‘free will’ – which we attribute to man, but deny 
to all other creatures or phenomena.
190
 
This free will is something man cannot divest himself of: it is an ‘unsought 
and inescapable “freedom” which in some respects [humans] are ill-equipped to 
exercise.’191 However, European civilization (which Oakeshott and Tocqueville are 
concerned with) also displays a character that is, in a way, open to this fate. It 
recognizes in free will ‘the emblem of human dignity’ and ‘a condition for each 
individual to cultivate, to make the most of, and to enjoy as an opportunity rather 
than suffer as a burden.’192 This is the character that prizes self-determination and 
personal autonomy. Oakeshott clarifies that treasuring such autonomy does not 
imply a surrender to the subjective will, the seeking of a state of indulgence or the 
canonization of ‘conscience’. Neither is it the worship of conformity or the desire to 
be different at all costs. It does not advocate a belief in unconditional choices or an 
indifference to moral or prudential practices or the disposition to follow only self-
made rules.
193
 In fact, the last qualities especially remind us of the Rationalist 
disposition which Oakeshott is so critical of. Finally personal autonomy does not 
imply lone action; it does not preclude individuals coming together to form 
associations of common purpose. As we shall see in the next chapter, what is 
necessary is that these associations be voluntary. Oakeshott identifies the rise of this 
character as a defining moment in the history of modern Europe. This ‘experience of 
individuality’ had an overwhelming impact on Europe, the modern European state, 
and modern western political theory.
194
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Oakeshott sees the classic expression of this character of individuality or 
self-determination in Montaigne’s Essays: ‘a reading of the human condition in 
which a man’s life is understood as an adventure in personal self-enactment.’195 In 
Montaigne’s writing there no is expectation for the salvation of the human race 
through politics, redemption through technology, or the discovery of ‘the truth’, 
‘there was only a prompting not to be dismayed at our own imperfections’ and a 
belief ‘that is it something almost divine for a man to know how to belong to 
himself’ and to live by that understanding.’ Memorably, Oakeshott calls Montaigne 
‘Augustine come again to confound both Gnostics and Pelagians’: those who claim 
the existence of hidden, redemptive ‘sciences’ and those who entertain unalloyed 
optimism about man’s ability to escape his current lot – to save himself.196 Oakeshott 
also saw this character in the understanding of the state displayed by the authors of 
the American Declaration of Independence, the authors of the Federalists papers, the 




Oakeshott and Tocqueville, as we by now understand, are sceptical about 
reason and progress, and eschew grand social and political projects. Because they are 
aware of man’s dignity as a free agent with self-understanding, but who are also 
aware that ‘the half of this self-understanding is in knowing its own limits’198, they 
defend a traditional, conservative, outlook on politics. Politics which focuses on the 
‘social’ and which is concerned with engineering and moulding society through the 
use of technology is dangerous for two reasons: firstly we are incapable of achieving 
these grand projects, secondly, attempting such projects often tempts us to ignore or 
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discount the importance of the freedom which gives us our dignity. The remainder of 
this thesis will discuss how Oakeshott’s and Tocqueville’s sceptical conservatism 
and, is reflected in their understanding of the state and politics. In Chapter Three we 
will discuss how the vital insight of man’s contingent, yet free, character affects our 
understanding of liberty and citizenship. In Chapter Four we look at why this insight 
should leave us sceptical about certain claims made by modern politics, and our 






THE STATE AND ITS PROPER LIMITS 
 
Michael Oakeshott and Alexis de Tocqueville display a degree of 
scepticism and pessimism regarding the human character but also staunchly uphold 
the freedom that gives humankind its unique dignity. One aspect without the other 
would lead to an imbalanced view of man. Since even in its most humble and 
‘limited’ form, the state is usually a ubiquitous object, its influence on the interaction 
between liberty and human dignity is large.   
Pessimism about human character might lead to two extreme views on the 
role and necessity of the state. On one extreme is the view that the remedy is a 
strong, authoritarian state. Men do not know what they want or what is good for 
them. The state must decide for them. This is often not said so blatantly, but it is an 
attitude that is exposed in many speeches and action of state leaders, especially those 
in regimes that style themselves as ‘benevolent dictatorships’. The other extreme is 
to take a very grudging view of the state. After all, if human character is corruptible, 
it certainly isn’t wise to entrust a small group of people with great power. Oakeshott 
and Tocqueville avoid both extremes. The state has a valued, legitimate and limited 
place on which both society and the individual depend.  
Oakeshott says that much intellectual effort has been devoted to answering 
the question of who should make up the state. He wished, however, to consider the 
other vital question: deciding on what a state could or could not legitimately do; state 
action rather than state composition.
199
 Tocqueville’s writing has a similar purpose. 
The question of who governs was the preeminent point of contention in both the 
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French and American Revolutions (though the rights and duties of the state also 
figured in the writing and thought of the time – the slogan ‘no taxation without 
representation’, for example,  might be interpreted as a statement on what the state 
can legitimately do). The French revolutionaries assumed that once the difficult 
problem of who governs is solved, the miseries that besought society could be 
avoided. This was a strong assumption among the Marxist revolutionaries too. With 
the coming of powerful technology (and also the receding of religion from the public 
square), one forgets one’s inabilities – what constrains us is the state and our 
technological progress. The important question becomes ‘who governs?’ and once 
that’s answered (‘the people’): ‘what can government do to solve our problems?’ 
Tocqueville, however, realised that answering the ‘who governs’ question was not 
enough. No matter who governs, the state apparatus, and the people who operate it, 
overreach and encroach into areas in which they had no business entering. 
 
The Development of the Modern State 
The desire for power and control has been with man from his earliest days – 
at least that is what the myths of our civilization tell us. Rulers have always sought 
greater control, but, for most of our history, they have rarely had the physical 
capacity (the potentia) to maintain widespread and in depth control of their realm. 
Medieval European realms thus had no single centralized authority.
200
 This, 
however, would change and with improvements in technology, state capacity has 
increased. Concurrently, there also occurred changes to existing views on authority 
affected and understanding of the role of the state. The authority of medieval 
European monarchs was limited because they had ‘partners’ who shared some of the 
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authority. Parliaments and aristocrats within their territories and the Roman pontiff’s 
international authority (which was manifest within their realms in the independence 
of the local church and the ecclesiastical courts) denied medieval monarchs the sole 
authority that they sought. The sixteenth century saw these monarchs ‘extinguish’ 
their partners and appropriate their authority and divest ‘themselves of all 
obligations to hitherto superior authorities.’201 Eliminating competing claimants like 
the nobles and parliaments at home and the emperor abroad were all part of this 
move, but ‘by far the most important source of the increased authority of the rulers 
of modern Europe came from their acquisition of the authority (and often of the 
property) of the church.’202  
 
The State as a Product of History 
One term that is ubiquitous in a discussion on the features of a modern state 
is ‘sovereignty’. Oakeshott defines sovereignty as the recognition of a sole law-
making authority when its authority to make law is not believed to be restrained by 
another superior power and when there is no law within that particular society which 
the government may not repeal or amend.
203
 Sovereignty became seen as catering to 
the ‘felt needs’ of the state’s subjects. This is odd, Oakeshott tells us, because the 
law, when it was not so malleable, has traditionally been seen as the ‘private man’s 
most cherished protection against the actions of a powerful government.’204 And yet, 
the ‘dangerous adventure of handing over to government the unlimited authority to 
make and to repeal law’ has been pursued by every state in modern Europe. What 
would motivate this openness to powerful government? Oakeshott believes that the 
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people of Europe looked to their rulers for release from hindrances put forth by the 
traditional legal institutions of their time: the old rights and duties – sacrosanct and 
difficult to alter – hampered the modern enterprises of profit and happiness.205  
Right from the outset, however, it began to be clear that such ‘sovereign’ 
law-making authority was dangerous to all subjects alike – even to those who 
benefitted from the felling of traditional limitations and hindrances – and there 
emerged the desire to place limits on sovereignty. The problem, however, is that 
sovereignty, by definition, cannot be limited. A state’s actual, physical power 
(potentia) is never absolute, but a sovereign’s legal authority (potestas) is 
unlimited.
206
 In modern times, then, we face the ‘relatively new situation of rulers 
who may have much more power than they have authority, and rulers disposed to 
live up to the extent of their power and even to confuse their power with their 
authority.’207 Finally the state can to more than it ought to. 
The question ‘What should government do?’ therefore is a very important 
one and exploring a couple of related questions – What is a state? and What does it 
mean to rule? is helpful in furnishing an answer. In his Lectures in the History of 
Political Thought Oakeshott identifies three metaphors for the state while in On 
Human Conduct he famously elaborates on the two ways of understanding the state 
as an association of human beings. The two categorizations are not unrelated.  
In his lectures, Oakeshott points to three ways in which the state has been, 
and still is, understood: the state as a natural community; as an artificial association; 
and as a fitting neither the natural nor the artificial categories, but sharing features of 








both – which Oakeshott calls a ‘historic bond’.208 An understanding of the state as a 
natural community takes the form of several organic analogies: the human body, a 
colony of ants, or a family.
209
 In modern times, however, by far the most important 
analogy is the state as identified as a ‘nation’ – a collectivity larger than a family, but 
distinguished from other groups in terms of language, a ‘common blood’, a religion, 
or some other common and exclusive character.
210
 This was a powerful notion and 
has influenced much of political thought and more of political practice.  
The second understanding of the state was as a creation of members joined 
together by artificial bonds – an ‘association’.211 This version was powerful because 
of the obviously unnatural beginnings of most modern states but also implied ‘that 
each individual human being was a “natural” unity and had no “natural” ties with 
any other human being.’212 We have two analogies of the state as an artificial 
association that spring from these two historical changes: the joint-stock company 
and the religious sect. Both were reflected in works of political theory, the former in 
the writings of Bacon and the latter in that of Calvin, for example.  
The third category is ‘more difficult to describe, but not less important.’213 
This view breaks with the assumption that everything in the world must be either 
‘natural’ or ‘artificial’.214 The state is seen as not entirely natural because ‘nature’, as 
we have discussed in the last chapter, implies ‘necessity’, while the ‘world of 
“history” is the world of things which are contingent, and might have been other 
than they are.’215 Likewise, the state is seen as not entirely artificial because an 


















artefact is ‘designed and made to serve some specific and premeditated purpose.’ 
Something ‘historical’, however, though a product of human choices, is not designed 
in this way. The state is therefore not a collection of people bound by common blood 
nor is it a joint-stock company. Instead, ‘it is forged by time and circumstance’ and 
‘the memory of shared experiences.’216 Burke’s writing shows intimations of this 
historical understanding when he, after grappling with the fact that while the state 
was never ‘made’ in any contract or specific agreement it still was more artificial 
than natural. He concludes that the state is ‘a compact of all the ages’.217 It is a 
compact, however, that nobody expressly signed. Oakeshott offers the analogy of a 
language or a landscape to help illustrate this understanding of a state: ‘a blend of 
“nature” and “art”, a blend of the “necessary” and the “chosen”, of the “given” and 
the “made”, in which the “given” and the “made” are indistinguishable.’218 The state, 
like a landscape, is also both stable and malleable at the same time. Though he 
doesn’t discuss it further here, one can imagine that Oakeshott has in mind the type 
of malleability that he attributes to tradition in Political Education.
219
  
This vision of the state provides a mean between the two extreme attitudes 
towards the state mentioned at the opening of this chapter. It requires neither mere 
acceptance, since the state is contingent and can be changed according to our 




‘A “state” understood in terms of this analogy is neither a god to be 
worshiped nor a formless chaos to be merely endured. It is something 
for which we are conditionally responsible. And it suggests that the 












relations between its members are nether the relations of “natural” and 
“necessary” ties, nor the relations of partners in pursuit of the 
achievement of specific and chosen utilities, but the relations of those 
who share a common experience.’221 
Tocqueville’s understanding of the state can also be said to be ‘historical’ in 
this sense. Three ‘causes’ contribute to the democratic institutions of the United 
States: the particular and accidental situation into which Providence had placed the 
Americans (in other words, natural circumstances), their laws, and their ‘habits and 
mores’.222 The latter he defines as the ‘habits of the heart’, but also the current 
opinions and the ‘sum of ideas of which the habits of the mind are formed.’223  The 
three causes are not equally influential, however. Certainly the Americans found 
themselves in a favourable situation – part of which Tocqueville attributes to 
Providence, and part to the special ‘point of departure’ which the founders made 
from the histories of their European forebears. However, the laws that the Americans 
had devised played a more important role in determining the character of American 
democracy. A comparative analysis of the United States and other colonies of the 
New World reveals that physical causes in themselves ‘do not influence the destiny 
of nations as much as one supposes’ and that it is the laws and mores of the 
Americans that ‘form the special reason for their greatness.’224  
Between the laws and the mores though, Tocqueville places greater 
importance upon the latter. He makes comparisons within the Anglo-Americans 
themselves and notes that, while the laws are uniform, habits are not, and where 
democratic government has a longer history, certain favourable habits have 
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  He concludes therefore that even ‘the happiest situation and the best 
laws cannot maintain a constitution despite mores, whereas the latter turn even the 
most unfavourable positions and the worst laws to good account.’226 This, he says, is 
the central point of his work, ‘the end of all my ideas.’ And the principal goal of his 
writing is to impress on his readers the ‘importance that I attribute to the practical 
experience of the Americans, to their habits, their opinions – in a word, to their 
mores – in the maintenance of their laws.’227  
Mores are products of history; they comprise a tradition of thought, 
behaviour, opinions and ideals. A state which is understood to be formed primarily 
through such historical factors can hardly be result of foresight and precision. Also, 
mores are not the products of theory – they are the outcomes of experience, and trial 
and error. Oakeshott understands the history of the modern state in similar terms: the 
states of modern Europe evolved slowly out of a diversity of local conditions. They 
bear the marks of an interplay between circumstance and agency. ‘Each was the 
outcome of human choices, but none was the product of a design.’228 It is hard to 
harbour delusions of grandeur when a state is properly understood as a product of 
human muddling.  Here again is the Montaignean scepticism about human 
institutions. Montaigne himself defended the authority of laws themselves, while 
also being scathing about the origins of those laws: ‘They are often made by fools... 
by men, vain and irresolute authors.’229   
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The State and Human Dignity 
What then is the state rightly allowed to do? One answer is already implied 
by Oakeshott’s first set of categories: if the state is a product of historical choices, 
state action must not wildly veer away from the shared experience that form the 
bonds that unite its citizens,  nor must it apply too much strain on the relationship of 
choice that forms its basis. In his second set in On Human Conduct, Oakeshott 
expands and clarifies the answer to this question.  
We have already noted that Oakeshott and Tocqueville, though sceptical 
about our abilities, attribute to humankind a dignity which other creatures do not 
possess. Humanity is in need of caution, but does not deserve contempt. We also 
noted that this human dignity comes from individuals being free agents. Now, 
having recalled how the particular characteristics of the modern state have developed 
over the last centuries, let us ask the question: how must a state be constituted such 
that it does not impose grievous obstacles upon individual free will, where man’s 
free will may be enacted (in the form of self-determination and autonomy) with the 
least cost?  
Oakeshott identifies three distinctive features that the modern state acquired 
right from its emergence and has never lost since: an office of authority, an 
apparatus of power, and a mode of association.
230
 He considers the third feature in 
great depth and develops two categories – ‘civil’ and ‘enterprise’ – to explain the 
state as a human association. His understanding of the state as a civil association was 
his attempt to explain how a state could be constituted so as to respect human 
agency.  
 
                                                          
230
 Michael Oakeshott, ‘Talking Politics’, in RP, 441. 
 66 
The Enterprise State 
In a state that is understood as an enterprise, human beings are related to 
one another in terms of the joint pursuit of some recognized substantive purpose, a 
common enterprise. The office of authority is recognized as the custodian and 
director of this common goal.  In other words, in a state that is modelled after such 
an association, the many become one, united in a common goal, and in making 
choices that promote that goal, governed by instrumental rules that are in place 
precisely because they further that goal.
231
 While hard to justify historically (since 
the early modern state ‘was a supremely miscellaneous collection of 
communities’232) states came to be talked about in such terms. The so-called 
‘enlightened’ rulers of the eighteenth century, for example, understood themselves to 
be the guardians of a comprehensive ‘national interest’. These rulers took on the role 




Today, whenever such words as ‘national interest’, ‘national program’, 
following an inspired ‘leader’, government ‘articulating the national values’, 
‘defining the national goals’, ‘marshalling the national will’, or ‘transforming 
society’ are used to talk about the activities of the state, it is the state as a purposive 
association that is being articulated. Moreover, the vision of the state as an enterprise 
is particularly strong when the state is at war, and especially when the war is looked 
upon as a sort of crusade.
234
 ‘Words such as “organic”, “authoritarian”, “collectivist” 
and “totalitarian” are often used to describe a state thus understood. And all the old 
words such as “liberal”, “progressive”, “democratic”, “dictatorial” are corrupted still 
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Oakeshott links the popularity of the enterprise state to the rise of a 
character that was ‘obliquely opposed’ to the character of the individual, but was 
also a product of the modern era: the ‘individual manqué’: the masses left behind by 
tide of individuality; men who had no use for the right to ‘pursue happiness’ (which 
was a burden), but claimed, instead, the right to ‘enjoy happiness’.236 To the 
individual manqué, the morality of individuality created around him a very hostile 
environment. Personal identity was burdensome to those who preferred the 
anonymity and familiarity of communal life.  Such people sought, and found in some 
measure, protection in the government. ‘The “godly prince” of the Reformation and 
his lineal descendant, the “enlightened despot” of the eighteenth century, were 
political inventions for making choices for those indisposed to making choices for 
themselves.’237   
Tocqueville shares this explanation. In such a state, there is a ‘permanent 
tendency...to concentrate all governmental power in the hands of the sole power that 
directly represents the people one perceives no more than equal individuals confused 
in a common mass.’ Once the state is vested with all this governmental power, the 
strong tendency is for it to also try and penetrate into the minutiae of administration 
too.
238
 Tocqueville observes this in the French Revolution which exhibited a startling 
double character: The revolutionaries were considered the enemies of the monarchy 
and its institutions yet, after the fall of the monarchy, they were defenders of 
administrative centralization. ‘In this manner, one can remain popular and be an 
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enemy of the rights of the people; a hidden servant of tyranny and an avowed lover 
of freedom.’239  
Tocqueville, in seeking to clarify the word ‘centralization’, distinguishes 
between two distinct forms of centralization: ‘governmental’ and ‘administrative’. 
The former involves concentrating power regarding ‘interests...common to all parts 
of the nation’ like ‘the formation of general laws’ and foreign policy.240 The latter 
relates to more local and domestic affairs.  
One form of centralization without the other does not pose a significant 
danger to freedom. In fact, one form has its proper role in the statecraft: Tocqueville 
holds strong governmental centralization to be vital to the survival of a nation. 
Administrative centralization, however, ‘is fit only to enervate the people who 
submit to it, because it constantly tends to diminish the spirit of the city in them.’241 
When the two are joined – when a sole body holds both preponderant administrative 
and governmental potestas – that body ‘acquires an immense force’ and ‘habituates 
men to make a complete and continual abstraction from their wills, to obey not once 
and on one point, but in everything and every day.’242 In other words, what results is 
the destruction, not just on rare occasions but as a practice, of the free exercise of 
moral agency. Eventually what is seen is not just the occasional use of force, but the 
subduing of the individual through habit; ‘it isolates them and afterwards fastens 
them one by one onto the common mass.’243  
In the America of his day, Tocqueville does not find cause to be alarmed: 
‘in the United States, the majority, which often has the tastes and instincts of a 
despot, still lacks the most perfected instruments of tyranny.’ Administrative 
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centralization is absent in Tocqueville’s America because the majority has not ‘even 
conceived the desire for it’, being contended with rendering itself all-powerful in its 
governmental capacities. It also had not the capacity, no matter how passionate it 
might be about its projects, to ‘make all citizens in all places, in the same manner, at 
the same moment, bend to its desires.’244 He does repeat his warning though that if 
the two forms of centralization were combined in America along with ‘and after 
having regulated the great interests of the country it would descend to the limit of 
individual interests, freedom would soon be banished from the New World.’245  
As a result, what Tocqueville calls ‘the spirit of the court’ – an attitude of 
flattery and feigned approval – is much more rampant in democracies than in 
absolute monarchies and ‘one encounters many more people who seek to speculate 
about its weakness and to live at the expense of its passions than in absolute 
monarchies.’ He considers that this attitude leads to a ‘much more general 
abasement of souls’ in democracies.246 Even worse is that individuality and human 
dignity tend to be sacrificed for the achievement of the greater good. Tocqueville 
talks about seeing around him people ‘who, in the name of progress, [strive] to make 
man into matter.’247  
C.S. Lewis warns that even good men given charge over the ‘curing’ of 
people ‘would act as cruelly and unjustly as the greatest tyrants.’248 The issue is not 
whether the head of an enterprise association is likely to be a particularly evil 
individual. In fact Lewis believes that ‘good men’ might, in some respects, act even 
worse than the typical despot.  
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‘Of all tyrannies a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its 
victims may be the most oppressive. It may be better to live under 
robber barons than under omnipotent moral busybodies. The robber 
baron’s cruelty may sometimes sleep, his cupidity may at some point 
be satiated; but those who torment us for our own good will torment 
us without end for they do so with the approval of their own 
conscience. They may be more likely to go to Heaven yet at the same 
time likelier to make a Hell on earth. Their very kindness stings with 
intolerable insult. To be ‘cured’ against one’s will and cured of states 
which we may not regard as disease is to be put on a level with those 
who have not yet reached the age of reason or those who never will; to 
be classed with infants, imbeciles, and domestic animals.’249 
There is another, related, problem with basing the state on a chosen 
common goal. Let us take a hypothetical case where an entire population at one 
point actually did agree to a common enterprise, and decided to base their laws as 
well as the state’s authority on this common enterprise. There is integrity at this 
point: the particular persons involved in this agreement will something and are not 
unfairly deterred from enacting this will. Goals, however, are volatile and it is 
conceivable that over time an increasing number of enterprisers would find their 
goals diverging from and eventually contradicting the original goals of the enterprise 
state. The state is a non-voluntary organization and it is not feasible for an individual 
to leave a state to avoid being forced to act contrary to a strongly-held belief. The 
problem is thus not the individual tyrant: enlightened teleocrats and enterprise states, 
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by their nature, impose severe constrains on autonomy, which, by its definition, 
requires individuals not being forced to act in direct opposition to moral consciences. 
 
The Alternative: Civil Association 
The second of Oakeshott’s two categories is the state as a civil association – 
a relationship of fellow citizens in terms of non-instrumental rules of conduct which, 
unlike the rules that define an enterprise, do not promote the achievement of a 
particular substantive purpose.
250
 These non-instrumental rules are laws properly so, 
and ‘specify and prescribe, not choices to be made or actions to be performed, but 
conditions to be subscribed to in choosing and acting’251. To avoid such rules being 
confused with the various rules and rule-like instructions, instruments, and 
provisions that are commonly also called ‘law’ in the modern vocabulary of politics, 
Oakeshott calls the rules of a civil association by the Latin word ‘lex’. Lex, then, is 
the collection of ‘rules which prescribe the common responsibilities (and the 
counterpart “rights” to have these responsibilities fulfilled) of agents in terms of 
which they put by their characters as enterprises and put by all that differentiates 
them from one another and recognize themselves as formal equals.’252 
The rules of a civil association can be likened, though not perfectly, to the 
rules of a game. The rules of football, for instance, do not instruct players how to 
score a goal or how to win; they merely prescribe conditions players must abide by 
as they try to score goals and win. Unlike the rules of a game which provide 
individually for the kinds of actions and occasions which make up that game, or the 
rules of enterprise association which provide only for the particular sorts of 
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engagements that constitute the pursuit of that enterprise, the laws of civil 
association ‘are not imposed upon an already shaped and articulated engagement’. 
They  
‘relate to the miscellaneous, unforeseeable choices and transactions 
of agents each concerned to live the life of “a man like me”, who are 
joined in no common purpose or engagement, who may be strangers 
to one another, the objects of whose loves are as various as 
themselves, and who may lack any but this moral allegiance to one 
another’253 
Furthermore, although each item of lex may concern some citizens more than others, 
none is a command issued to any particular citizen: its prescriptions define relations 




Authority and Moral Agency in the Civil Associational State 
Oakeshott asks an important question: how could a manifold of rules, many 
of unknown origin, often inconvenient, neither demanding nor capable of evoking 
the approval of all whom they concern, and never more than a very imperfect 
reflection of what are currently believed to be ‘just’ conditions of conduct, be 
acknowledged to be authoritative? He answers ‘that authority is the only conceivable 
attribute it could be indisputably acknowledged to have.’ In short such a manifold of 
rules can be capable of evoking the acceptance of all citizens without exception, only 
when understood in respect of its authority.
255
 Nothing else – not the ability to 
provide for wants and cater to interests, nor the acknowledgement of the successful 
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fruits these rules might bear, nor their perceived alignment with a particular moral 
theorem – suffice.  
Authority, obligation, and non-instrumental rules seem severe and coercive. 
‘Remote, mysterious, cold and insulated alike from consent or dissent to their 
demands, clothed in pitiless majesty, they ask neither to be loved not to be 
approved.’ Characterized like this, it is not hard to see why these (and not their 
alternatives) are often seen as affronts to freedom. However, Oakeshott argues that 
this is a caricature of authority and obligation and bears little resemblance to civil 
authority or civil obligation.
256
 
The prescriptions of civil authority indeed do not seek approval nor are they 
dependent on the subjective goals of their subjects, but, on the other hand, they are 
not expressions of ‘will’ and their injunctions are not merely orders to be obeyed; 
their subjects are not servile role-performers. ‘[T]he distinctive quality of civil 
freedom, the recognition given in civitas to moral agency, springs from civil 
association being rule and relationship in terms of authority in contrast to the not less 
genuine, but wholly different, freedom which belongs to enterprise association.’257 
The freedom of a member of an enterprise association exists because his situation is 
his own choice: he is pursuing an agreed common purpose and he can extricate 
himself by choosing to do so. If this choice of extricating himself from his situation 
once he ceases to share the common purpose is not available, the link between belief 
and conduct is broken.
258
  
The civil condition is not like this. Citizens are related solely by their 
acknowledgement of the authority of prescribed conditions. These conditions do not 
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prescribe satisfactions to be sought or actions to be performed, but a moral condition 
to be subscribed to while the citizens pursue their own self-chosen goals. According 
to Oakeshott, this means that there is nothing in civil association that threatens moral 
agency and ‘in acknowledging civil authority, [citizens] have given no hostages to a 
future in which, their approvals and choices no longer being what they were, they 
can remain free only in an act of dissociation.’259  
Herein lies another advantage of the civil association. The 
acknowledgement of authority is not something that fluctuates a great deal; in fact, it 
probably solidifies over time.  If rooted in tradition and changeable within such a 
tradition, it is not an obstacle to moral change. Goals, and purposes, however, are 
much more transitory. Making these the basis of a non-voluntary association sets up 
inevitable negative consequences both for the authority of the state and for freedom 
of the individual.   
Is it reasonable though, given man’s nature and tendencies, to expect 
citizens to be satisfied with the rather aloof civil associational state? Human beings 
have strongly-held interests and, as we have seen above, tend to look to the state as 
an ally in pursuing these interests. How could one expect the state to steer clear of 
becoming an enterprise association? Although I will not spend much time 
elaborating a detailed response to this, let me at least hint at one. Oakeshott is not at 
all critical of enterprise associations per se. His is not a dichotomy ‘between those 
who value purposive association and those who do not, or between those who have a 
compassionate regard for their fellow men and those who have none; it concerns 
only the character of a state as an association of human beings.’260 Its very nature as 
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a nonvoluntary association does not allow the state to be a purposive association 
without disregarding human moral agency.  
It is not from the state that moral agents should seek the fulfilment of wants. 
It is through enterprise associations that operate outside the state. Perhaps the most 
memorable lines in Democracy in America give us a clue as to what form this could 
take: 
‘Americans of all ages, all conditions, all minds constantly unite. Not 
only do they have commercial and industrial associations in which all 
take part, but they also have a thousand other kinds: religious, moral, 
gave, futile, very general and very particular, immense and very small; 
Americans use associations to give fêtes, to found seminaries, to build 
inns, to raise churches, to distribute books, to send missionaries to the 
antipodes; in this manner they create hospitals, prisons, schools. 
Finally, it is a question of bringing to light a truth or developing a 
sentiment with the support of a great example, they association. 
Everywhere that, at the head of a new undertaking, you see the 
government in France and a great lord in England, count on it that you 
will perceive an association in the United States.’261   
It is this, and not the coercive apparatus of the state, that should be utilized by those 
who wish to ‘fix a common goal to the efforts of many men and to have get them to 
advance to it freely.’262 And it is this associational life of the United States during his 
time that Tocqueville credited with helping curb both the selfishness and despotism 
that are the intertwined dangers of the democratic centuries. 
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Of course, this is not an easy task. Tocqueville admits that ‘to persuade men 
that they ought to occupy themselves with their affairs is an arduous undertaking.’263 
He admits that it is difficult to awaken a sleeping people, who prefer court etiquette 
to less glorified work like repairing a town hall, and give it civil qualities that it 
lacks.
264
 He also warns us that this tendency is strongest in a democracy. In a 
democracy, where equality is the driving ideal, the ‘habits and presentiments’ of the 
people ‘predispose them to recognize such a power and to lend it a hand.’ 
Tocqueville notices among the democratic peoples of his time a ‘growing love for 
well-being’ which makes them dread material disorder. 
‘Love of public tranquillity is often the sole political passion that these 
peoples preserve, and it becomes more active and powerful in them as 
all the others are weakened and die; this naturally disposes citizens 
constantly to give the central power new rights, or to allow it to take 
them; it alone seems to them to have the interest and the means to 
defend them from anarchy by defending itself.’265  
Furthermore, the envy of privilege – and ‘immortal hatred’ which is most intense 
among democratic peoples – ‘favours the gradual concentration of all political rights 
in the hands of the sole representative of the state. The sovereign, being necessarily 
above all citizens and uncontested, does not excite the envy of any of them, and each 
believes he deprives his equals of all the prerogatives he concedes to it.’266 In 
Chapter Two we discussed how limitless, short-term wants often motivate politics.
267
 
Tocqueville believes that the people of democratic societies ‘do indeed accept the 
general principle that the public power ought not to intervene in private affairs’, but 
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each of these individuals desires that this public power comes to his aid in that 
‘special affair that preoccupies him, and he seeks to attract the action of the 
government to his side, all the while wanting to shrink it for everyone else.’ When a 
host of citizens adopt this sort of attitude towards the state, ‘the sphere of the central 
power spreads insensibly on all sides though each of them wishes to restrict it’.268  
 Conversely, the state also finds the egalitarianism and uniformity that is so 
pronounced in democratic societies to their great advantage. Every central power 
born out of the instincts just described ‘loves equality and favours it; for equality 
singularly facilitates the action of such a power, extends it, and secures it.’269 The 
central government also ‘adores uniformity’ which allows more thorough and 
efficient control since it dispenses of the need to cater to a wide variety of 
circumstances and objects.
270
 Finally, it is not just government in general that pushes 
for centralization and uniformity. Tocqueville also identifies the force of the 
‘passions of all who lead’ the government as a contributor to centralization. 
Ambition drives men to extend the prerogatives of the central power in the hope of 
being able to direct it one day. Tocqueville betrays his pessimism about the motives 
of holders of public office when he says that ‘It is a waste of one’s time to want to 
prove to them that extreme centralization can be harmful to the state, since they 
centralize for themselves. Among public men of democracies there are scarcely any 
but very disinterested or very mediocre people who want to decentralize power. The 
former are rare and the latter powerless.’271 Given this two-fold love for centralized 
government, Tocqueville concludes that in the dawning democratic era, ‘individual 
independence and local liberties will always be the product of art. Centralization will 
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be the natural government.’272 ‘A democratic government therefore increases its 
prerogatives by the sole fact that it endures. Time works for it; all accidents profit it; 
individual passions aid it without even knowing it...’273 
Oakeshott too admits that those who prefer the state as a civil association 
might have a harder task defending their choice than their opponents. The civil 
associational state might seem cold and un-human. It certainly does not cater to 
man’s superficial wants and desires. It might seem convenient (especially where a 
politically apathetic climate prevails) to entrust to the state the making of choices 
regarding common goals. However, for those who recognize in the dignity of the 
individual person the right “to choose one’s own destinations, even if they don’t 
reach them”, the civil association has much to recommend it.274 It also has much to 
offer one who, aware of human failings, does not want to risk the placing of 
overweening power into the hands of a state composed of men and women capable 
of misjudgement, irrational behaviour (often championed under the guise of 
‘Reason’) and lust for power. The civil association is no mean idea: it expects much 
from those who commit to it, especially in the form of restraint. Paradoxically 
though, it is also the attitude towards government that best suits the failings in the 
human character.   
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WHAT IS POLITICS? 
 
This chapter is specifically on the understanding of the activity of politics. 
Discussions that would fit into this chapter have been undertaken in previous 
chapters already, but this chapter will serve to focus attention on the sceptical 
understanding of politics.  
Supporting a vibrant politics necessarily includes realising the nature and 
limits of politics. If, in zeal for improving the lot of human society, those involved in 
politics attempt to make politics what it is not, they cause the undermining and 
withering away of politics itself. The first chapter of On Human Conduct and several 
of his shorter works contain Michael Oakeshott’s theory of persuasion and its place 
in politics. In it, he rejects the tendency that turns politics into a process of proving 
the correctness or the desirability of particular laws, a tendency that is, nonetheless, 
very understandable and natural, something which he points out in Rationalism in 
Politics. Neither is politics the imposition of the subjective wants of one person or 
group of people on another.  
Oakeshott understands politics (the process of arriving at the desirable 
content of lex) as both a private and a public action. Politics is private in that it 
involves an agent, or a group of agents, ‘negotiating with the holders of offices of 
authority’ (in most cases, legislators) for a change in lex.275 But politics is also 
uniquely public because of the very subject of negotiation. Politics in the mode of 
civil association is not bargaining for the satisfaction of private wants. The want 
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under negotiation is not that the legislator should respond in a particular, wished-for, 
manner, nor is it that some agents should perform a certain action, but that all 
citizens should have a civil obligation which they do not already have. The object of 
politics is ‘a rule which prescribes conditions to be subscribed to by all alike in 
unspecifiable future performances.’276 The ultimate effects of politics are, therefore, 
binding on all and often enforceable by coercion.  
Even those who do recognize the existence of the Natural Law or those who 
believe in the capability of the human mind to reason out correct principles upon 
which society should run, must concede that there would be some individuals who 
did not agree with the prescriptions they derive from these beliefs. Compulsion to 
accept even a truth is incompatible with a belief in the dignity of the individual 
human person. Regardless of whether a particular moral theorem is true or false, 
heedless of whether a particular set of policy would or would not promote some sort 
of ‘general happiness’, no set of rules can be imposed on the citizens without there 
being a consequent loss of individual freedom.  
Politics, therefore, must be ‘a deliberative and a persuasive or 
argumentative, not a demonstrative undertaking.’277 Because of the many conflicting 
visions of the good, and because ‘there must always be more than one opinion about 
what constitutes a desirable condition of a system of lex’, politics is a contentious 
process.
278
 The desirability of laws cannot be argued in terms of satisfying a want or 
promoting a sought-after substantive outcome. Nor can its desirability be voiced in 
terms of its connection with some superior norm, a moral rule, a principle of utility, 
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or a prescriptive Law of Reason or of Nature. And finally, a general norm of moral 
conduct cannot be used to justify the creation of removal of parts of the law.
279
   
‘In short political proposals are conclusions, and whether or not they 
have been significantly deliberated, they are deliberative conclusions; 
and whether or not they are proposed and recommended in a 
persuasive argument, the utterances in which they are made known 
belong to the discourse of persuasion, not of proof.’280  
Hence, political arguments cannot be refuted but can, instead, ‘be resisted or 
rebutted by arguments of the same sort which call in question its guesses, its 
calculations, its prognostications, and its attributions of desirability.’281  
Since politics is a contingent activity ‘of responding to conditions of things 
already recognized to be a product of choices’282, there is a ‘necessary absence of a 
ready and indisputable criterion for determining the desirability of a legislative 
proposal.’283 Debate and persuasion are therefore the tools of a politician. This is 
mirrored in the vibrancy of the political activity in the US that left a strong 
impression on Tocqueville. Nothing in the American political scene that Tocqueville 
encountered was suggestive of clear-cut answers to the political issues of his day: 
‘Scarcely have you descended on the soil of America when you find yourself in the 
midst of a sort of tumult; a confused clamour is raised on all sides; a thousand voices 
come to your ear at the same time, each of them expressing some social needs.’ 284 
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A political situation requires a public response, as opposed to the private 
one, by ‘someone recognized to have the authority to respond to it.’285 Politics also 
involves deliberation or reflection. Each political situation is a ‘contingent event or 
complex of events, the product of human sentiments; and each requires 
interpretation’ and since a response is required to each situation, ‘this interpretation 
will be diagnostic or prognostic, not explanatory’. Deliberation is required even to 
identify and interpret that a political situation does indeed exist, and also in arriving 
at the choice of response to be made in that situation, for, given its contingent nature, 
its dependency on circumstance, ‘a political situation is one to which there is no 
necessary response.’286   
The particular characteristic of political deliberation is that it involves  
‘political “ideologies” [which] may be considered either as 
vocabularies of beliefs, which invite political discourse to take certain 
reactions and to reach certain conclusions, or as composed of beliefs 
which, because of the logical status given to them, impose a certain 
logical design upon political discourse and impose a certain logical 
status upon its conclusions.’287  
Political deliberation therefore relies on ‘aids to deliberation, guesses of varying 
generality, made with different degrees of confidence and drawing upon evidence of 
varying quality, which, in deliberation, are not subjected to the test of a criterion 
superior to themselves but are made to criticize and illuminate one another.’288 
Drawing on Aristotle, Oakeshott calls the reasoning that forms political discourse a 
syllogism ‘in which the major premise is a maxim and in which one at least of the 
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minors may be suppressed as a matter of common knowledge or agreement. A 
maxim is a general statement relating to what is usually to be expected in human 
conduct, or to what is normally agreed to be desirable.’ 289  
Now we begin to understand why politics cannot be about proving the 
correctness of desirability of laws. Arguments based on maxims ‘cannot be refuted 
by showing that their major premise is not certainly true or by showing that the 
conclusion is uncertain, because such arguments do not pretend to be dialectical 
demonstration.’ In fact, any sort of refutation is, strictly speaking, impossible. What 
is available in such situations therefore are ‘arguments of the same sort’, that is other 




In addition, political discourse involves decisions regarding the good or 
harm that might be expected to follow a proposed course of action which is gauged 
by what promotes or impedes human happiness. However, human happiness in the 
context of political discourse cannot be ‘understood to be a simple, universal, 
unchanging condition of things, but to be composed of the complex, changing 
conditions of things, often circumstantially discrepant from one another, which we 
are usually disposed to agree to be desirable.’ Here too then, just like in the 
syllogistic form of argument, we encounter maxims which cannot be refuted (as they 
could be if human happiness were known to be a universal, unchanging condition of 
things). Furthermore, political discourse involves both weighing different proposals 
against each other regarding which proposal generates the more ‘goods’ and 
comparing different goods to show why certain goods should be secured at the 
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expense of others. ‘[T]he form such an argument must take is a weighing of pros and 
cons and conjecture about likely consequences of action.”291 
In On Human Conduct, Oakeshott characterizes one who engages in 
deliberation as ‘an agent not heedless of the future’, but also ‘not knowing for 
certain what the future will be as a consequence of his action’ yet believing that his 
response does have an effect on the outcome.
292
 Perhaps this contingency appears as 
a constraint, something we yearn to overcome, yet Oakeshott urges us not to think of 
deliberation ‘as a regrettable frustration of a demonstrative manner of thinking’. In 
other words, deliberation is not a corruption, a feeble relative, of demonstrative 
arguments. Quite the opposite: ‘It is the only kind of argument in which an agent can 
recommend an action to himself, and its reasons are the only kind of reasons which 
may legitimately be adduced for having made this rather than that choice.’293  
Another form of activity related to politics, going hand in hand with, but 
which also has its having differences from deliberation is persuasion which is ‘a 
recommendation to choose and to perform an action in terms of the alleged merits of 
its likely outcome.’294 It is an ‘utterance which divulges (or at least points to) the 
response wished for and also moves (or at least invites) the respondent to make it.’ 
295
 Persuasion, as is understood by its everyday connotation as well, is addressed 
towards a ‘reflective consciousness’ or a reasoning person, who can receive it ‘only 
in terms of believing, doubting, or disbelieving’ and has the choice of being, or not 
being, persuaded by the utterances to arrive at a conclusion.
 296
 Persuasive argument 
recommends certain choices, defends the suitability or condemns the ill of choices 
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 Oakeshott summarizes it pithily: ‘It is addressed to choosers and its 
design is to evoke a choice.’298  
Such a definition of persuasion immediately excludes such methods of 
influencing another’s decisions as hypnotism, electrical shocks, chemical injections, 
physical deprivation, and so on. ‘It may be allowed, however, to include exhortation, 
encouragement, pleading, coaxing, reproof, expostulation, polemic, diatribe, or even 
utterances designed to alarm for these are all appeals to intelligence.’299 Blackmail, 
which, though it does recognise the agency of the other, ‘nevertheless divert[s] his 
attention from what is being recommended and direct[s] it elsewhere,’ is not 
persuasion. Neither is it persuasion to attach a promise of reward or threat of penalty 
to a certain choice. Oakeshott even excludes, in all but rare cases, such actions as 
demonstrations (in the sense of rallies) in favour certain actions because it is often 
not the merits of the action itself, but the foreseen disapproval of the demonstrators 




It is in argumentative discourse, negotiation and debate (with or without an 
audience other than the debaters) that persuasive utterance is best observed because 
‘here utterance is unequivocally directed to the situation to be responded to and to 
the merits of the recommended response in terms of its likely outcome.’301 It does 
not pretend to demonstrate its conclusions and consequently it cannot be refuted. But 
it may be resisted or rebutted by arguments of the same sort which call in question 
its guesses, its calculation, its prognostications, and its attributions of desirability.’302  
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Politics and Proof 
Here we come to another characteristic of persuasion, and political 
discourse in general. The arguments used in persuasion are ‘governed by the nature 
of the audience even more than by the nature of the theme.’ Political argument is a 
failure if it is unable to persuade, and to move, its audience. The criterion for success 
here is therefore very different from that of demonstrative argument and especially 
from such things as proofs of geometrical theorems. One engaging in the latter need 
take no regard for the particular audience he is addressing.
303
 Tocqueville notes the 
importance of the audience in democratic societies: the politician in a democracy 
faces an electorate whose ‘democratic instability makes it change its face constantly. 
He must therefore captivate it every day. He is never sure of them; and if they 
abandon him, he is immediately without resources.’ His fortunes are intrinsically 
bound to the group of people whom he claims to represent.
304
 In Oakeshott’s work 
on persuasion we are faced with two important criticisms associated with non-
demonstrative political discourse, the second of which Oakeshott says is more 
radical than the first. Both are related with the phenomenon of the audience and with 
sincerity and integrity. 
(1) The orator recommends to his audience a policy that he genuinely believes in 
himself. He has, after some thought on the situation at hand, come to the conclusion 
that it is better than the other alternatives available to him. However, this is not 
enough. He has to figure out how to convince the relevant audience of the merits of 
his policy. ‘It is probable, and in many cases unavoidable, that his argument and his 
real reasons for selecting this policy part company.’ This tendency to seek arguments 
that suit one’s audience - arguments that are divergent from the actual reasons that 
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convinced the orator himself – makes political argument itself, because it is designed 
to persuade, and not to simply give one’s reasons, become suspect. 305 ‘Political 
argument is, then, governed by its design to induce agreement or concurrence.’ Since 
it seeks voluntary support, it must appeal to the beliefs of the audience and not just 
rely on the beliefs help by the speaker. ‘In short, as argument, it is counterfeit 
activity. It is only genuine if you regard it simply as a device to persuade.’306  
(2) The second criticism points to something more insidious. It argues that the falsity 
that the previous criticism identified in the act of persuasion may in fact also affect 
the political proposals themselves. Politics ‘is liable to cease altogether to be the art 
of making appropriate responses to emergent political situations and to become the 
art of persuasion.’ Oakeshott points out the ramifications of this: if this is true, 
political argument becomes seen as a means of acquiring power rather than of 
persuasion. ‘’[T]he whole thing becomes intellectually a counterfeit activity, or at 
best it has no real defences against becoming so. Compared with this defect, all the 
other defects which might be recognized in politics (such as imprecision and 
uncertaint) are of very small account.’307 
Now we understand even better the attempts to escape the current form that 
political discourse takes, or, as Oakeshott puts it, why ‘people have tried to devise 
manners of thinking and talking about political situations which are not infected with 
what may be called this “disease”’ 308 Of course there is also the desire do away with 
the lesser, but still quite irksome problem of uncertainty that characterizes political 
deliberation. Deliberative discourse ‘has been thought to be profoundly 
unsatisfactory’ no matter how polished the rhetorical material available to the 
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discourse. It is too dependent on ‘imperfectly predictable contingency’. Oakeshott 
summarizes this dissatisfaction in the question ‘Can we not do better than these 
surmises and conjectures, shots in the dark and actions recommended because they 
are marginally preferable to others?’309  
The escape from these hindrances offers itself in the form of a political 
discourse with, ‘a different logical design from that which belongs to the 
deliberations of Pericles and that which Aristotle examined in the Rhetoric.’ This 
alternative Oakeshott calls demonstrative political discourse which could take shape 
under at least two different conditions: Either if there were principles or axioms of 
absolute certainty and of universal application to which any political proposal could 
be referred when deciding on its merits, or, alternatively, if we possessed enough 
information on the human condition and the ‘conditions of political society’, 
allowing prediction, rather than conjecture, about the consequences of the various 
possible decisions available.
310
 An attempt at the former is seen in Plato and his 
followers, and of the latter in Marx.  
The reliance on axioms, taking a form akin to the geometrical proof, 
addresses the problem of corruption and deceit because the geometrician is not 
corrupted by the need to use arguments which do not necessarily convince himself. 
‘These axioms were either absolute moral values, or natural or human rights, or a 
natural law – something that could be regarded as axiomatic and from which you 
could argue.’ 311 This fails because axioms divested of contingency  cannot be 
applied usefully to concrete political situations. Demonstrative argument can be 
concerned only with the relations between abstract ideas. ‘But as soon as argument 
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concerns itself with any contingent emergent situation (with what to do about a 
subject city in revolt, for example) it must relapse from proof into undemonstrative 
argument.’312  
The second alternative, that of Marx, failed because explanatory laws of 
social change which Marx tried to establish (and even the success of this is 
debateable), ‘would still not have furnished us with informative propositions in 
terms of which political deliberation and discourse could be carried on, much less 
terms in which they could become demonstrative.’313 Any argument meant to 
recommend an action – which is the case in politics – is designed to show not just 
the consequences of a particular action, but that the said consequences are better than 
any other. However, ‘no distinction between better and worse conditions of things 
can be derived from the sort of information provided by explanatory “laws” of 
human conduct or social change. Explanatory “laws” can themselves provide no 
prescriptions.’314 This second option is therefore also incapable of producing 
‘correct’ political decisions; nor does it provide criteria from which political 
decisions can be judged to be ‘correct’ or ‘incorrect’.315 
This project of achieving demonstrative political deliberation through 
ideologies that claim to have discovered explanatory ‘laws’ of social change or 
development ‘is one of the greatest traumatic experiences of the early twentieth 
century.’316 However, as was the case with Rationalism317, such trauma did not cut 
short the endeavour to attain a demonstrative political discourse. Oakeshott does, 
however, sense a ‘slackening of the impulse’: no one truthfully believes in the 
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fundamentals of the project anymore.
318
 However, ‘the larger hope of, somehow, 
emancipating political deliberation from mere opinion and conjecture has not 
evaporated’, though it has lowered its ambitions. Thus, instead of ‘laws’ of social 
change, what is sought after now is information that can provide ‘correct’ diagnosis, 
prediction and, hence, ‘correct’ political decisions. Oakeshott goes on to identify the 
various terminologies that come with this updated effort: terminology and activities 
that are quite familiar to modern political scientists: ‘comparative study’, ‘ideal 
types’, statistical analysis and probabilities. ‘And this enterprise has come to 
describe itself as the “end of ideologies”.319 Oakeshott also cautions that while proof 
itself is known to be impossible, ‘persuasion by purporting to prove’ is still in use. 
What is important is that the audience you are addressing thinks you are able to 
provide proof; and certain audiences are predisposed to believe that you can indeed 
prove that your political proposal is the ‘correct one’. 320 This then is a new 
rhetorical device in the arsenal of the modern politician.
321
 It feeds on the very thing 
is it claiming to overcome: the propensity for politicians to cater their arguments, not 
to reality but to the predilections of their audiences. 
Let us pause for a moment to consider whether Tocqueville himself is guilty 
of such an endeavour – or, at least, was he a precursor to this attitude towards 
politics? After all, he is recognized as a pioneer in modern, empirical political 
science (which today is increasingly reliant on statistics and data analysis to arrive at 
political proposals). And we did encounter some of his comparative analysis in his 
discussion on the relative importance of physical circumstances, laws and mores on 
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the situation in America.
322
 But Tocqueville does not claim to be providing ‘laws’ or 
even information to be used for making of political decisions. Oakeshott’s criticism 
of Marxism does not mean that all political observation and generalization is 
dangerous. What is dangerous and foolish is a faith in ‘explanatory laws’ in the 
sphere of politics – and in most human conduct for that matter. Explanatory laws 
work in geometry and physics. However, Tocqueville is very aware that human 
beings and human institutions do not behave like inert bodies. The mixture of choice 
and unpredictable circumstance that makes human affairs so unique is a prominent 
theme throughout his works. Democracy in America opens with the vision of the 
great beast of democracy - often exhibiting its ‘savage instincts’ during its 
‘irresistible’ march across the western world.323 The book’s very last lines carry 
forth the theme too. He rejects both ‘false and cowardly doctrines’ that say that 
people have no control over their circumstances as well as the hubris of believing 
that man is perfect master of his fate. ‘Providence has not created the human race 
either entirely independent or perfectly slave. It traces, it is true, a fatal circle around 
each man that he cannot leave; but within its vast limits man is powerful and free; so 
too with people.’324 Tocqueville’s Old Regime and the French Revolution is a lesson 
on unintended consequences and on the futility and utter danger of grand 
revolutions. Even his memoirs are alive with reminiscences of Tocqueville the 
politician responding as best he could to the circumstances on the ground – the 
politics Tocqueville himself practised was not based on grand theories or laws. It 
would not be too bold to say that it is his political experiences that reinforced a 
sceptical, conservative attitude on human conduct in general and politics in 
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particular. One sees how events so often outrun the actors involved, how Tocqueville 
himself had to wrestle with his circumstances in order to try and stay on top of 
events, to control his political fate.
325
 
Tocqueville himself does not have as coherent and obvious a theory of 
political rhetoric as Oakeshott does, but it is quite apparent that a politics that aspired 
after demonstrative proof was something he would have found quite unacceptable. 
Perhaps this explains why he is unfazed by the constant movement and change that 
he witnesses in America. But would not constant change to the laws of the land be 
against the sceptical conservative attitude and therefore disturbing to Tocqueville? 
Does it not betray the type of rationalistic meddlesomeness that I have argued both 
Oakeshott and Tocqueville criticize?  
Perhaps not. Constant change that was meant to answer to some dictate of 
reason or the ‘common good’, or subjective will determined by the ‘ruler’ is one 
thing. This was what the French Revolution took to an extreme. The change 
Tocqueville observes in America is not directed by a person or group of people. It 
does not really answer to any higher ‘law’. Rather, this movement is not as troubling 
because ‘the American mind turns away from general ideas’ and in politics it is 
examples rather than lessons that they prefer.
326
 This changefulness might still be 
worrisome for other reasons – they can be symptoms of fickleness and 
capriciousness, they might result in politics becoming a negotiation for the fulfilment 
of petty wants –  but it is not the rationalistic change that Oakeshott later identifies. 
This was especially so as long as the foundational mores themselves were not 
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constantly changing. And Tocqueville observes that in America, the morals, and thus 
presumably the mores, are constant.
327
  
Therefore the awesome spectacle of political restlessness (a restlessness 
very different from revolutionary agitation) that greets Tocqueville is seen as an 
emblem of the freedom of the New World.  
‘Around you everything moves: here, the people of one 
neighbourhood have gathered to learn if a church ought to be built; 
there, they are working on the choice of a representative; farther on, 
the deputies of a district are going to town in all haste in order to 
decide about some local improvements; in another place, the famers of 
a village abandon their furrows to go discuss the plan of a road or a 
school. Citizens assemble with the sole goal of declaring that they 
disapprove of the course of government, whereas others gather to 
proclaim that the men in place are the fathers of their country.’328  
At this point it is helpful to remember the differentiation between civil society and 
the state. Certainly the two spheres are not isolated from each other. But there is 
some sort of separation. The movement Tocqueville observes is initiated and 
primarily takes place within civil society, not the state. It is interesting that while 
Tocqueville believes that a vibrant society restrains the advance of the preponderant 
state, Oakeshott’s caution is addressed in the converse direction: ‘A community 
given to rapid and perpetual change in the directions of its activities stands in 
particular need of a manner of government not itself readily involved in change.’329  
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Tocqueville makes no attempt at hiding the fact that a sceptical politics is 
highly inefficient. ‘When the enemies of democracy claim that one alone does better 
what he takes charge of than the government of all, it seems to me that they are 
right.’330 Not only do we have the flaws of the activity of persuasion and deliberation 
that Oakeshott identified, we also hear from Tocqueville that this sort of politics 
lacks, among other virtues, coherence and perseverance, and can be careless about 
the details of the policies it undertakes.
331
 Thus, neither Oakeshott nor Tocqueville is 
blind to these defects. They support this politics nonetheless because of the 
advantages it has: it is better suited to the limitations of our human character and it 
accommodates individual freedom. Tocqueville goes one step further however, 
doing something that Oakeshott refuses to do, and also recommends the ‘democratic’ 
politics on the account that though ‘it does each thing less well...it does more things’ 





Politics and Moral Relationships 
Does this mean that there are no criteria by which to judge law and politics 
in a civil association? It does not: Oakeshott charts an important, and interesting, 
middle ground.  He does not hold that politics is unconcerned with moral 
relationships. His argument is that what is civilly desirable cannot simply be inferred 
from general moral desirabilities. One cannot ‘prove’ the desirability of a particular 
law merely by pointing to a moral principle, or a tenet of natural law, or by claiming 
that it is the rational thing to do. Concepts and ideas present in certain moral 
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theorems or in the natural law can tell us about the conduct of civic intercourse, but 
only once they ‘have been “civilized” by being given civil meanings...elicited 
mindfully but incidentally, from a practice of civil intercourse’. They must also be 
understood to be subject to modification and their present conditions are recognized 
to be products of civil reflection.
333
 What I believe this means is that for general 
principles to count in the making of law, they must first be internalized into the 
tradition of civil intercourse of the particular association of citizens in question. 
Moral principles cannot simply be pulled out of the metaphorical hat to justify acts 
of legislation.  
Oakeshott is proposing a strong connection between law and tradition. Law 
may be enacted but the considerations that determine what laws should be enacted 
are traditional ones. This may seem odd because tradition is often seen as restrictive 
and even despotic. Does this mean that the basis of the laws of a particular society 
cannot change over time, cannot be criticized and improved? Such a view of 
tradition, which, as we have already noted, gained prominence during the French 
Enlightenment, is for Oakeshott a gross misunderstanding. Tradition, he argues, is  
“neither fixed nor finished; it has no changeless centre....Some parts 
of it may change more slowly than others, but none is immune from 
change. Everything is temporary. Nevertheless...all its parts do not 
change at the same time and...the changes it undergoes are potential 
within it. Its principle is a principle of continuity: authority is diffused 
between past, present, and future; between the old, the new, and what 
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is to come. It is steady because, though it moves, it is never wholly in 
motion; and though it is tranquil, it is never wholly at rest.”334  
And this is what politics should look like, too: not the rupturing imposition of 
external principles, but a steady reform (when required) from within. 
A civic tradition (unlike, say, a monolithic ‘rational’ principle) is complex 
and tolerates divergent ideals – the pursuit, by citizens, of incommensurable goods 
and the existence contradictory principles. Because the moral principles that ought to 
influence the law in a civil association are tenets that have been ‘civilized’ and 
internalized, over time, into the very tradition in which the association has been 
developing, what we have is not an imposition from the outside by the few over the 
many, by the rationalist onto the masses, the benevolent tyrant over his subjects. The 
correspondence between law and tradition does not guarantee its ‘justice’ by some 
external abstract standard, but in a state that approaches the requirements of civil 
association, it does subject law to the justice of practices of civil conduct and 
discourse that presuppose the coexistence of independent persons on the basis of a 
common body of laws that respects their independence.  
 
The Politics of Faith 
There is another kind of politics, related to the understanding of politics as 
proof, that we must discuss by way of conclusion. Oakeshott’s warning about the 
dangers of salvific politics – the ‘politics of faith’ – is contained most fully in his 
posthumously published book The Politics of Faith and the Politics of Scepticism. 
Here he identifies two poles – extremes of theoretical understanding as well as actual 
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historic extremes of conduct – between which modern politics has fluctuated.335 It is 
the former that we are most interested in, as it is towards this pole that modern 
politics has been swinging.
336
 ‘In the politics of faith, the activity of governing is 
understood to be in the service of the perfection of mankind.’337 This ‘faith’ flows, 
not (as the term might suggest) from a belief in a perfect Creator and his ‘assured but 
not deserved’ providential grace. Rather, it is hostile to such notions, and is based on 
the belief that perfectibility is possible through human means and that ‘we need not, 
and should not, depend upon the working of divine providence for the salvation of 
mankind.’ It is therefore not coincidental that the politics of faith achieved its 
‘confidence and adult language’ in modern times – in the eighteenth century.338 
Tocqueville provides us with an explanation for this. Religion, unlike law, 
prevents people ‘from conceiving everything and forbids them to dare everything...if 
it does not give them the taste for freedom, it singularly facilities their use of it.’339 
When the ‘lights of faith’ in God are obscured, however, men lose sight of eternity 
and they seek results not in the future, but closer and closer to the present.
340
 ‘As 
soon as they lose the habit of placing their principal hopes in the long term, they are 
naturally brought to want to realize their least desires without delay, and it seems 
that from the moment they despair of living an eternity, they are disposed to act as if 
they will exist only for a single day.’341 The meeting of ‘irreligion and democracy’ 
he calls ‘an unhappy convergence’ because it diminishes great undertakings with the 
eye on the future, replacing them with constant short-term wants.
342
 Something else 
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is lost as well. Without religion, the human spirit ‘perceives an unlimited field before 
itself’ regarding earthly activities.343 Those desires whose fulfilment used to be left 
until eternity were now sought within temporality and naturally became programmes 
for politics.  
Oakeshott also emphasizes the sharp distinction between the religious and 
the secular outlooks. Christianity is seen as an attitude, a rejection of the worldly 
way of thinking: the rejection of the ideals of ambition, productivity, and 
achievement, and the belief that something is valuable only as much as it contributes 
to some future, external, contingent result.
344
 For Oakeshott, religion is not merely 
the fulfilment of a contract in order to win future salvation: ‘it is to be “saved” here 
and now, delivered from the treadmill of egoism and the Faustian tyranny of 
“achievement,” which in another idiom has been the bane of European politics.’345 It 
is therefore not merely irreligion that threatens the balance between the eternal and 
the temporal. A prudential interpretation of religion, focusing on temporal 
achievement is just as worrisome.  
Tocqueville saw in the American preachers of his time this struggle to 
maintain such a balance. They were not always successful: ‘it is often difficult to 
know when listening to them if the principle object of religion is to procure eternal 
felicity in the other world or well-being in this one.’346 Ross Douthat, in his book 
Bad Religion, argues that this tendency to lose sight of the eternal in favour of the 
temporal has increased in the last century. Douthat portrays the history of American 
Christianity as an interplay between mainline Christianity and less orthodox sections 
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of the faith. He proposes that while ‘America’s heretics’ – the non-orthodox stream 
of American religion – have pushed the country towards new ideas and moral 
stances (the commitment to religious freedom and early condemnations of slavery 
for example), Christian orthodoxy – ‘the shared theological commitments of that 
have defined the parameters of Christianity since the early Church’ (and not the 
orthodoxy of any specific Christian church or denomination) – has had several vital 
roles to play in the American experiment. It has acted as a glue – tangible and 
intangible – that binds together a diverse nation and provided a common vocabulary 
for the great cultural and political debates.
347
 It has also been a source of ‘national 
unease’. Its insistence of continuity has often provided a means of dissent from two 
forms of rationalistic tendencies: the intellectual overconfidence of the 
Enlightenment and the anti-intellectualism of the nineteenth-century revivalism, 
from scientism and from ‘crass materialism’ and from the literalism of 
fundamentalism.
348
 Douthat argues that this institutional Christianity has been 
declining over the last five decades. The goal is now constant progress: ‘a belief 
system that’s simpler or more reasonable, more authentic or more up-to-date.’ 
However, Douthat argues that the results vindicate the older understanding of 
Christianity: ‘Heresy sets out to be simpler and more appealing and more rational, 
but it often ends up being more extreme.’349 And while the extreme has always been 
part of the American religious landscape (Tocqueville observed it too), the orthodox 
response today is especially weak.  
The most popular strain of theology today is represented by works such as 
Joel Osteen’s Your Best Life Now: 7 Steps to Living at Your Full Potential, which is 
                                                          
347
 Ross Douthat, Bad Religion: How We Became a Nation of Heretics (New York: Free 
Press, 2012), 7 
348




part of (or at least evolved from) what is called the ‘prosperity gospel’. For mainline 
Christianity, scriptural passages like the metaphor of the camel and the eye of a 
needle point to a condemnation of acquisitiveness – the worship of Mammon. This 
introduces a uneasy relationship with ‘the world’, with temporal affairs and in 
particular the main temporal affair of earning and distributing resources. Douthat 
argues that the prosperity gospel and its less extreme Evangelical paths do away with 
this uneasiness by emphasizing one part of Christian doctrine – that all things in the 
temporal life are gifts from the Creator – but erasing the hard teachings that balance 
this out. The message is popular – it fits well with the aspirations of upwardly 
mobile members of the American middle class and also meshes quite well with what 
is called the American Dream.
350
 However, it is also antithetical to the sort of faith 
that Tocqueville believed would act as a bulwark against the tendency to place all 
one’s hopes in temporal action and look for the rewards of eternity in the short-term 
future. The politics of faith thrives on this tendency since it is the annexing into 
politics what was once the domain of God: ‘Perfection, or salvation, is something to 
be achieved in this world: man is redeemable in history.’351  
Oakeshott reiterates two important features of the politics of faith. Firstly, 
in this style of politics, the activity of governing is certainly not understood 
something that facilitates the pursuit of other desirables. Nor is it merely an auxiliary 
agent in the pursuit of perfection itself. Rather, it is the ‘chief inspirer and sole 
director of the pursuit.’352 It would be very unremarkable if this style merely 
involved the belief that government should contribute in some way to the 
improvement of the lot of humankind. No – what is attributed to government in the 
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politics of faith is ‘the duty and the power to “save” mankind.’353 Secondly, the 
understanding of ‘perfection’ can vary quite widely. The improvement of our 
circumstances can be undertaken in two ways. The first (non-perfectionist) mode 
involves, at each decision-making stage, a search for the ‘better’, improved way of 
engaging with a particular activity or circumstance. ‘Neither the improvements 
themselves, not the adjustments between them, intimate or impose a single track.’354 
The other manner of pursuing improvement – the politics of faith – is to first fix 
which direction leads to the ‘best ‘ result and to pursue that direction. The decision is 
made not because it is better than other available options, but because it is the best.  
‘In short, if you posit a single road, no matter how solely you are 
prepared to move along it or how great the harvest you expect to 
gather as you go, you are a perfectionist, not because you know in 
detail what is at the end, but because you have excluded every other 
road and are content with the certainty that perfection lies wherever it 
leads.’355  
The politics of faith, then, is characterised by the belief that human power is, or can 
be, sufficient to procure salvation and that the word ‘“perfection”...denotes a single, 
comprehensive condition of human circumstance’ of which we can at least discern a 
general outline. Politics, and political decision-making therefore can ‘never be 
understood as a temporary expedient or just doing something to keep things going’: 
it is a response to the common good or the conclusion that follows from a rational 
argument and thus becomes a ‘means of arriving at the “truth”, for excluding “error” 
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and for making the “truth” prevail.’356 Concentration of power would be a most 
welcome occurrence as the government forms itself as the ‘representative of the 
society in an enterprise of communal self-assertion whose purpose will be the 
spiritual, if not the physical conquest of the world: to hide the “truth” would be 
treachery, to be idle in propagating it, disgrace.’357 
Formality in the creation and application of laws is seen as an unnecessary 
hindrance to the ‘godlike activity’ of governing. ‘Rights, the means of redress, will 
be incongruous, their place taken by a single, comprehensive Right – the right to 
participate in the improvement which leads to perfection.’358 Oakeshott also warns of 
the threat to other great legal British traditions: the important role of precedent, the 
abhorrence of retrospective legislation, punishment rather than prevention, the 
presumption of innocence rather than guilt. Political opposition, another great British 
legacy, will be considered only temporarily useful, and eventually a hindrance, or 
worse, once the ‘truth’ has been made apparent.359 All opposition to the salvific task 
of the government eventually come to be suppressed as errors.
360
 All activity must be 
directed towards this salvific goal, comprehensive security, set by the government. 
Individual freedom to pursue private goals becomes impossible. Even ‘lack of 
enthusiasm will be considered a crime, ‘to be prevented by education and to be 
punished as treason.’361 Now the politics of faith is an extreme pole, an ideal type 
which is only approached or intimated in actual politics. This thesis will not attempt 
the comprehensively tackle the issue of the European Union, although it is an very 
pertinent topic. However, Oakeshott’s fears for political opposition and other 
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traditions of liberty were echoed by the second President of the Czech Republic, 
Václav Klaus, in a 2009 speech to the European Parliament: 
The present decision-making system of the European Union is 
different from a classic parliamentary democracy, tested and proven 
by history. In a normal parliamentary system, part of the MPs support 
the government and part support the opposition. In the European 
Parliament, this arrangement has been missing. Here, only one single 
alternative is being promoted, and those who dare think about a 
different option are labelled as enemies of European integration.
362
  
European integration seems to be something like a dogma in some circles and the 
steadfastness with which leaders of the EU project (several of whom are not 
democratically elected and thus not directly accountable to the demos for their 
decision-making) press for greater integration, despite wariness and even the 
occasional outright rejection on the part of the citizens of Europe, might be a hint 
that the politics of faith is a temptation today, and not just in obviously totalitarian 
regimes like the Soviet Union. 
 Eventually, Oakeshott argues, the politics of faith leads to its own 
downfall: the destruction of politics itself. He dismisses as an illusion the argument 
that if ‘the people’, from whose submissiveness government derives its power, were 
to remain in control of the power generated by their submissiveness, such a 
destruction of politics itself would be avoided. Perfection, and comprehensive 
security, ‘cannot be enjoyed without a comprehensive mastery of the world, and no 
subject can enjoy comprehensive security without complete submissiveness to a 
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power great enough to win that mastery.’363 The politics of faith is devoid of a 
principle of self-limitation and is its own nemesis, although the fact that it is self-
defeating does not mean that the politics of faith will harmlessly blow itself out 
eventually; its self-destruction will involve a great deal of pain for those who find 
themselves in the way. 
 
  
                                                          
363






Michael Oakeshott and Alexis Tocqueville have not been examined side by 
side in significant depth and the word ‘sceptic’ is rarely used to describe 
Tocqueville, although Oakeshott considered him one.  Understanding the two 
thinkers as sceptics, however, explains their views on politics and, in the case of 
Tocqueville, helps shed light on his institutional recommendations.  
Having a vibrant political and civil society (which is what Tocqueville is 
most famous for championing) and well-designed institutions (the separation of 
powers and the American system of checks and balances, for example) are important 
and can act as antidotes to a preponderant state. But they are not a panacea and, 
without habits and mores that recognize (and are vigilant against) the limits of the 
state and of politics, can quite useless with civil society descending into a 
marketplace of wants and political institutions becoming the very tools of the 
preponderance they are intended to preserve against.  
However, it is the opposite of the sceptical attitude – the attitude of great 
optimism, great faith in the ‘rational choice’, confidence in the ability to achieve 
neatness and order in politics, the tendency to look to the state to fulfil every need 
and want – that often proves too much of a temptation. The not-ignoble desire to 
have a better politics, to banish the meanness and skulduggery that often appears 
inseparable from politics explains the motivation behind the swing towards a 
demonstrative politics and a politics that claims to solve problems and meet all the 
needs of the electorate, yet Oakeshott and Tocqueville view this as a mirage. At best 
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it leads to disappointed hopes and disengagement of the citizenry from political 
participation, at worst it is the eradication of politics itself and the basis of tyranny. 
I have aimed to show in the four preceding chapters that Tocqueville and 
Oakeshott, though writing in different centuries and responding to different 
circumstances, share a common basis to their political thought. Their understanding 
of the limitations of human character make them sceptical about many of the claims 
made on behalf of human affairs in general and on behalf of the state and politics in 
particular. Because they uphold the unique dignity of human beings as free moral 
agents while rejecting the unalloyed optimism that has characterized certain strains 
of political thought, and a predominant portion of political practice, they adopt a 
conservative attitude towards state activity and are critical of state actions that 
impose on the individual a substantive common goal or enterprise. They also are 
suspicious of attempts to rid politics of its ambiguity and uncertainty by searching 
for explanatory laws or proofs to guide political decision-making. These claims are 
falsehoods, and are often used as tools of oppression, wielded by modern tyrants for 
the ‘greater good’ of their subjects. 
The self-destructive nature of the politics of faith was mentioned in the 
previous chapter. The opposite extreme, which Oakeshott calls ‘the politics of 
scepticism’, is not sustainable on its own either. A balanced politics must comprise a 
mixture of both faith and scepticism. However, the failure that is the fate of politics 
that swings too far to the extreme of scepticism is not as spectacular as the 
destructive results of politics that approaches pure faith. Moreover, it is towards the 
latter pole, of faith, that modern politics has been teetering. Contemporary politics 
therefore needs an injection of scepticism. According to the sceptic, the imbalance of 
modern politics results from an excessive preoccupation with the future. To restore 
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the balance, ‘what needs to be promoted is the understanding of politics as a 
conversation in which past, present and future each has a voice.’ with none being 
allowed to completely predominate the conversation.
364
 Is this also not what it means 
to be conservative: to believe in a compact between past, present and future? 
Now, a sceptical conservative attitude towards politics – the denial of 
adventure and the refusal to aim for the heavens in politics – is a difficult one to 
maintain because modesty in human affairs can be quite unattractive. For men of 
adventure there is no glory; for the mass man, it is unsatisfactory because it does not 
attempt to feed his limitless wants.  Roger Scruton is extremely pessimistic about the 
attempts to inject scepticism into today’s politics. ‘It is the voice of wisdom in a 
world of noise. And for that very reason, no one hears it.’365  However drawing 
politics away from its attachment to ‘faith’ does not seem such a hopeless task to 
Oakeshott. Though ‘the version of English parliamentary government which has 
spread around the world is the bastard progeny of faith (“popular government” in the 
service of perfection)’, the resources of scepticism are still available, waiting to be 
utilized. Even though the great thinkers of the sceptical tradition – Oakeshott lists 
them out: Augustine, Pascal, Hobbes, Locke, Halifax, Hume, Burke, Paine, 
Bentham, Coleridge, Burckhardt, and Tocqueville – have been for a while displaced 
by the ‘pundits of faith’, they remain a patrimony awaiting reinterpretation. In fact, 
although these men might not be able to speak directly to our generation, Oakeshott 
believes that they are in a better position than the apostles of faith, ‘who for two 
centuries have merely repeated themselves.’366 More can be done for this project. It 
would be interesting, for example, to examine the influences of other sceptics on 
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Tocqueville and Oakeshott. Augustine, Montaigne and Pascal sound like good 
candidates for such an exercise because their influences are more or less explicit.
367
 
In conclusion, institutional change alone is insufficient in addressing the ills 
of modern democracy. Habits and mores must change, and this requires a change in 
the vocabulary and language of politics. True to the sceptical tradition though, what 
is needed is not a programme or a party platform but the broadening and enriching of 
political discourse by the inclusion of more voices of scepticism.  
It also involves nurturing individuality and the honouring human dignity 
and autonomy. ‘Salvation’ is, at most, a personal battle – it does not fall within the 
purview of politics. Greatness comes neither from spectacular success in politics nor 
from the unlimited satisfaction, by the state, of one’s every want. Greatness comes 
from learning to live as an individual and the man who has composed his soul and is 
living a life of virtue ‘is five hundred fathoms above kingdoms and duchies; he is 
himself his own empire.’368  
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